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INTRODUCTION
As anyone at all interested in the Supreme Court, freedom of religion, freedom
of speech, gay and lesbian rights, or even just wedding cakes could not help but be
aware, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission2 in June 2018. The case arose out of the type
of request that ordinarily would be expected to be the prelude to happy memories,
not litigation: Would Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, be able and
willing to do a custom wedding cake for a reception that a couple was planning to
celebrate their upcoming marriage? For Phillips, though, this was anything but an
ordinary request because the couple making it, Charlie Craig and David Mullins,
were both men. As Phillips explained when he refused the couple’s request, he deeply
believes, as a devout Christian, that same-sex marriage is wrong and that he should
not be engaged in an activity – designing and making a wedding cake – that God
would see as affirming the value of such marriages.3
Pursuant to Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act, which bars places of public
accommodation from discriminating on various grounds including sexual
orientation, Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado
Civil Rights Division. After investigating and finding probable cause that Phillips
had violated the Act, the Division referred the case to the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission. The Commission sent the case to an Administrative Law Judge for a
hearing. The ALJ ruled for Craig and Mullins, and the Commission affirmed on
appeal and ordered Phillips to treat same-sex and opposite-sex couples no differently
as customers. Before both the ALJ and the Commission, Phillips had unsuccessfully
argued that his refusal to make the cake did not violate the Act and that, even if it
did, the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution4 and its counterpart in the
Colorado Constitution mandate that he be granted an exemption from the Act.
With no greater success, he also had argued that an order requiring him to comply
with the couple’s request would violate the protection against compelled speech
afforded by the Free Speech Clauses of the federal and Colorado Constitutions.
After the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order and the
Colorado Supreme Court denied discretionary review, the U.S. Supreme Court
2
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). The description that follows of the parties, events, and legal proceedings in
Colorado is based on id. at 1724–27.
3
At the time – July 2012 – that Craig and Mullins sought to order the cake from Phillips, Colorado
did not allow same-sex marriage, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015), establishing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, was still almost three years away.
Craig and Mullins were planning to get married in Massachusetts and have the reception after returning
to Colorado. Massachusetts, the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, had legalized it in 2003. See
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts
Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]. . . .”). In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause applicable to state and local government.
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granted certiorari and, almost six months after hearing oral argument, handed down
a remarkably anticlimactic decision. It set aside the Commission’s order without
reaching the federal constitutional exemption claims that I and many other Courtwatchers across the political spectrum had been under the impression lay at the heart
of the case.5 Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy did rest on a free exercise
ground, but not one having anything in particular to do with exemption claims. He
maintained that the order directed at Phillips could not stand because it was fatally
tainted by evidence of hostility on the Commission’s part toward Phillips’s religious
beliefs. According to Justice Kennedy, Phillips was “entitled to the neutral and
respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case,” but that
consideration “was compromised here.”6 Instead, the Commission treated the case
in a way that “violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws
or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”7
I have no problem whatsoever with the neutrality principle Justice Kennedy
invoked. He cited the Free Exercise Clause for authority, and he could have pointed
to the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of an impartial tribunal as well.8 I am not
entirely persuaded, however, that the evidence of religious hostility on the
Commission’s part was sufficient under the Supreme Court’s precedents to justify
holding that Colorado failed to adjudicate Phillips’s rights with the requisite
neutrality.9
Perhaps I am not giving the Court’s stated ground for decision the credence it
deserves. If so, that is probably because the Court’s resting on that
ground—one so peripheral to the parties’ written and oral arguments and one so
much less consequential than the grounds avoided – seems to me to reflect above all
an eagerness on the part of some of the Justices to dispose as unobtrusively and
innocuously as possible of a hard case that they ultimately (if not initially) were sorry
the Court had agreed to hear.10 In any event, in keeping with this Symposium’s focus
5
A newspaper account the next day succinctly captured the limited significance of the case
as decided. “The breadth of the court’s majority” – everyone except Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor – “was a testament to the narrowness of the court’s reasoning.” Adam Liptak, Justices Favor
Baker in Case on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2018, at A1.
6
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
7
Id. at 1731.
8
See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.”).
9
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the evidence of hostility on the Commission’s part was
much less probative than the Court maintained. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749–51 (Ginsburg,
J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In addition, after posing what seems to be a very relevant question
– “What prejudice infected the determinations of the adjudicators in the case before and after the
Commission?” – she called attention to the Court’s silence on the matter. Id. at 1751.
10
To put it less delicately, the opinion seems to be crying out, “Let’s get out of here!” Writing shortly
after Masterpiece Cakeshop was handed down, Adam Liptak, The New York Times’s lead reporter on
the Supreme Court and surely one of the most frequent and perceptive observers of oral arguments at the
Court, recalled:

When the Colorado case was argued in December, Justice Kennedy seemed frustrated with the
main choices available to him and hinted that he was looking for an off ramp. His questions
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on religious exemptions, I leave for another day any further discussion of the Court’s
chosen ground for decision.
Although the free exercise exemption claim that the Court in Masterpiece
Cakeshop avoided deciding certainly comes within the scope of this Symposium, I
will forgo discussion of that issue as well. The Court in 1990 in Employment
Division v. Smith11 dramatically narrowed the range of free exercise exemption
claims to be given serious judicial scrutiny. Unless and until the Supreme Court
decides to overrule its decision in Smith, free exercise claims for exemptions from
generally applicable laws stand little chance of success even if they pit sincere, deeply
felt religious claims like Phillips’s against state interests far less important than
Colorado’s nondiscrimination interest in Masterpiece Cakeshop.12 In the more than
twenty-five years since Smith was decided, the Court has not shown any obvious
inclination to rethink its decision in Smith. Moreover, in his opinion for the Court
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy – at the time, the only remaining Justice

suggested that his vote had not been among the four that had been needed to add the case to
the court’s docket.

Liptak, supra note 5. Of course, if effecting a dignified escape indeed was the driving force of the Court’s
opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, it was hardly the first time—and undoubtedly will not be the last—
that the Court has written an opinion designed above all to extricate itself from having to decide the hard
issues in a case. For a classic in that regard, see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam)
(holding by a 5-4 margin that the case should be dismissed as moot, and not reaching the merits of the
petitioner’s equal protection challenge to a public law school’s use of affirmative action in its admissions
process).
11
494 U.S. 872 (1990), discussed infra text accompanying notes 28–33, 47.
12
In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Phillips did not argue that Smith should be overruled. Instead,
as he did in his arguments to the ALJ, the Commission, and the Colorado Court of Appeals, he
maintained that his claim fit within each of two narrow categories of free exercise claims that the Court
in Smith had expressly recognized as calling for rigorous judicial review. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
25–30, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
For present purposes, suffice it to say that I find Phillips’s attempt to shoehorn his claim into one of those
categories no more persuasive than the Colorado tribunals found it.
Phillips’s federal constitutional free speech claim, which this Article does not attempt to address,
almost certainly raised a much more substantial question under the Court’s compelled speech precedents
than his federal constitutional free exercise claim raised under Smith. In a concurring opinion, Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch made clear that they saw Phillips’s compelled speech claim as a strong one, even
though they stopped short of saying that the Court would have been justified in relying on it as a ground
for decision. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the potency under the Court’s precedents of Phillips’s compelled speech
claim seemingly became even clearer a few weeks after Masterpiece Cakeshop with the Court’s receptivity to the
compelled speech claim in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). On
the lively debate that transpired among free speech lawyers and scholars on Phillips’s free speech claim, see Adam
Liptak, Where to Draw Line on Free Speech? Wedding Cake Case Vexes Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2017, at
A11.
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from the 5-4 majority in Smith13 – appeared to reaffirm the basic holding in Smith
without explicitly citing the case.14
Featuring, however, a clash of interests so emblematic of today’s culture wars,15
Masterpiece Cakeshop does offer an almost ideal point of departure (and occasional
return) for discussing the limits that the Establishment Clause16 places on state and
federal legislatures and courts when they create religious exemptions and there is no
federal constitutional compulsion on them to do so. Suppose, for example, that after
losing in the Colorado Court of Appeals and failing to convince the Colorado
Supreme Court to hear the case, Phillips had decided not to seek review in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Rather, he decided to focus his energies on the Colorado legislature
and, with the help of some friends in high places, managed to persuade the legislature
to enact a religious exemption of the sort that he unsuccessfully had sought in the
courts. Should that exemption survive an Establishment Clause challenge?
Suppose instead that, after the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission’s order against Phillips, the Colorado Supreme Court had agreed to
hear the case and ultimately reversed on the ground that the Colorado Constitution’s
free exercise guarantee required that Phillips be granted an exemption from the
Anti-Discrimination Act. Should the U.S. Supreme Court agree to review that
decision and reverse on federal Establishment Clause grounds?17
13
In fact, when the Court decided Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy was the only remaining
Justice from the Smith Court altogether. Less than a month later, when Justice Kennedy announced that
he would be retiring effective July 31, 2018, see Michael D. Shear, Trump Set to Tilt Court as Kennedy
Retires, N.Y. TIMES June 28, 2018, at A1, it became clear that the Court would begin its 2018-19 Term
with none of the Justices who sat in Smith.
In referring in the above text to the “5-4 majority in Smith,” I am referring to the narrow majority
for Smith’s broad reinterpretation of free exercise constraints. In Smith the Court actually voted 6-3 to
deny the claim by the two respondents, Smith and Black, for a free exercise exemption from the Oregon
law at issue in the case. However, one of the six who voted to deny the claim – Justice O’Connor –
concurred only in the judgment and joined the dissenters in repudiating the Court’s dramatic departure
from the preexisting approach to free exercise constraints.
14
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (“The Court’s precedents make clear that the
baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to the free exercise
of religion limited by generally applicable laws.”).
15
The commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop soon after oral argument in the Supreme
Court – a time when Masterpiece Cakeshop seemed all but certain to yield a much more controversial set
of opinions by the Justices than it ultimately did – leaves little doubt of the high voltage of that clash of
interests. See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., How Not to Advance Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2017, at A27; Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Baker and the Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2017, at SR9;
Andrew Sullivan, The Case for the Baker in the Gay-Wedding Culture War, N.Y. MAG. DAILY
INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:38 A.M.), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/andrewsullivan-let-him-have-his-cake.html [https://perma.cc/UBL6-RSJZ].
16
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion….”).
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947), the Supreme Court held that the Establishment
Clause applies to state and local government by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.
17
Questions similar to the two I have just posed in the text arise when Congress creates religious
exemptions to federal statutes and when federal courts create religious exemptions in the course of
applying either of the two Acts of Congress that charge courts with carving out religious exemptions when
a balancing of individual and governmental interests calls for it. The two Acts and three Supreme Court
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In this Article, I propose an approach for deciding when the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause prohibits a legislature or court from carving out a religious
exemption. With space limitations in mind, I focus on articulating my approach, not
on critiquing possible alternatives.18 In Part I, I lay the groundwork for my proposal
by providing an overview of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and the
relationship between them. Drawing on important insights offered by Justice
O’Connor, I propose in Part II a first step for the approach. In doing so, I take as a
given that the endorsement test championed by Justice O’Connor continues to
command majority support on the Supreme Court – a proposition that I defended
at length in an article not long ago.19 In Part III, I spell out the remaining three steps
of my proposed approach and briefly explain the basic framework that the approach
puts into place. After commenting in Part IV on two Supreme Court decisions that
have special significance for the viability of the approach, I turn in Parts V, VI, and
VII to the issues that arise in making two determinations that lie at the heart of the
approach: whether the burden on religious liberty lifted by an exemption is
substantial, and whether denying an exemption is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest. In those Parts, I suggest answers to various questions raised by the
proposed approach, such as: What, if any, benchmarks exist to lend objectivity and
consistency to judges’ making those two key determinations? From whose
perspective should the substantiality of a burden be judged? How do possible ripple

decisions interpreting and applying them are discussed infra notes 48–60, 63–86 and accompanying text.
With regard specifically to the possible Establishment Clause problems raised by one of those decisions,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), see infra note 86.
18
In keeping with that focus, I cite only sources that I found helpful in developing my approach.
Anyone looking to my footnotes for a good bibliography of the literature on religious exemptions is well
advised to look elsewhere.
19
Gary J. Simson, Religious Arguments by Citizens to Influence Public Policy: The Lessons of the
Establishment Clause, 66 MERCER L. REV. 273, 284–300 (2015) (discussing the vitality of the
endorsement test prior to, and as applied in, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), the
Court’s leading Establishment Clause decision of the past decade). Nothing in the Court’s opinions since
I completed that article lead me to reassess my conclusion in the article that the endorsement test remains
good law, though by a narrow margin. Nor do the changes in the Court’s membership since that time
prompt me to revise my conclusion. The late Justice Scalia’s was an unequivocal opponent of the
endorsement test. See Simson, supra, at 285–86, 289–91, 293. Whether Justice Gorsuch, who was
appointed to Justice Scalia’s seat in April 2017, is any more favorably disposed to the endorsement test
remains to be seen, but the likely answer seems to be “no.” Cf. Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137
S. Ct. 2012, 2025–26 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part) (taking a position on
government funding of religion suggestive of a relaxed approach generally to the Establishment Clause
problems posed by government support of religion). The impact that Justice Kennedy’s retirement at the
end of the Court’s 2017-18 Term will have on the endorsement test’s continued vitality is even more
uncertain. Although Justice Kennedy initially was highly critical of the test and never explicitly disavowed
his discontent with it, he studiously avoided for years casting what would have been a decisive fifth
vote to overrule it. See Simson, supra, at 289-98. With Justice Kennedy’s successor yet to be confirmed,
it is much too early to say with any confidence how, if at all, Justice Kennedy’s retirement is apt to change
the Court’s balance on the question of the continued vitality of the endorsement test. With regard to the
various factors that tend to add uncertainty to predicting a Supreme Court nominee’s likely votes on
particular issues, see Gary J. Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 290–94 (1990).
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effects of exempting the claimant before the court factor into a determination
whether denying the exemption is necessary to serve a compelling state interest? The
Article concludes with some observations about the partnership between the
Religion Clauses.
Particularly because “harm to others” shares top billing in the title for this
Symposium, “Religious Exemptions and Harm to Others,” I probably should explain
before going further why I do not give it more attention than I do. There are two
main reasons. First, I do not see harm to others as a matter of independent
importance to the constitutionality of an exemption. My approach closely examines
an exemption’s impact on the government’s ability to achieve the objective(s) that
the law is designed to serve. To the extent that an exemption’s harm to others
undermines the government’s ability to achieve such objective(s), my approach
implicitly takes harm to others into account. If, however, an exemption’s harm to
others has no bearing on the government’s ability to achieve the law’s objective(s), I
believe such harm is irrelevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, and my
approach reflects that belief.
Second, whether or not an exemption causes harm to others is rarely, if ever, a
distinguishing feature. Exemptions almost invariably do cause harm to others. Some,
like the exemption sought in Masterpiece Cakeshop, cause harm to identifiable
individuals or classes of individuals. Others, like the exemption from Sunday closing
laws unsuccessfully sought in Braunfeld v. Brown,20 cause more generalized types of
harm to society. The important question for constitutional purposes is not whether
an exemption causes harm to others or whether the harm to others takes more
specific or general form. Instead, it is the extent to which such harm detracts from
the government’s ability to effectuate the law’s objective(s), and that question is
properly answered without giving special weight to the fact that harm to others,
rather than some other factor, is the factor undermining the government’s realization
of its objective(s).
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION
CLAUSES—ALONE AND IN COMBINATION
To answer the question of when religious exemptions should be found to violate
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, it is helpful to begin with the larger
question of which it is a part: In acting for the purpose of furthering religious liberty,
when can government go beyond the demands of the Free Exercise Clause without
overstepping the bounds of the Establishment Clause? At first glance, the answer
seems to be “never” under the two Establishment Clause tests that the Supreme
Court and lower courts have applied most often over the past several decades.
Under the first prong of the three-prong test that the Court announced in 1971
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, government action must have a “secular legislative

20

366 U.S. 599 (1961), discussed infra text accompanying notes 97–104.
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purpose.”21 As the Court made clear in later cases, that secular-purpose requirement
can be met by a showing of simply some secular purpose and does not call for
anything approaching a dominant or exclusive secular purpose.22 Nonetheless, action
that the government takes entirely in the name of protecting religious liberty—action
epitomized by a religious exemption to a generally applicable law—appears to fail
that undemanding requirement.
Under the endorsement test, which grew out of the Lemon test,23 the analysis
and conclusion appear to be much the same. The first of the test’s two prongs requires
the government to show only that its actions have some basis in a purpose other than
endorsing religion.24 However, the government seems hard-pressed to make that
showing when, acting for the avowed and solitary purpose of protecting some
persons’ religious liberty, it carves out a religious exemption from a generally
applicable law.
But so literal a reading, and so mechanical an application, of the two tests’
purpose prongs seems incongruous. Unless courts interpret the tests as treating as
valid a purpose of complying with the demands of the Free Exercise Clause, the tests
place the courts in a thoroughly anomalous position: on the one hand, courts have a
constitutional responsibility to decide claims of free exercise violations; on the other
hand, they would have no capacity to order relief for such violations because to do so
would be acting for a wholly religious purpose in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
An interpretation that harmonizes the demands of the two Clauses is much more
in keeping with the Clauses’ placement together in the constitutional text and with
the common origins25 and ultimate objective that unite them. To be sure, the two
21

403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602–04 (1988); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(1980) (per curiam). For detailed discussion and critical analysis of the Lemon test, see Gary J. Simson,
The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 905 (1987).
23
Although the endorsement test was not clearly articulated and adopted by a Supreme Court
majority until Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94, 599–601 (1989), it is probably best
understood as implicit in, and a subset of, the two-prong purpose-and-effect test of Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), which in 1971 became the first two prongs of the Lemon
test. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. In light, however, of Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), there is good reason to question how much, if anything,
remains of the Lemon test other than the endorsement test. Agostini basically collapsed the Lemon test’s
third prong – a requirement that the law under review “not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion,” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (internal quotation marks omitted) – into the test’s effect
prong. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–34. Zelman followed up by essentially eliminating government
financial support of religion—one of the historic “evils” that, according to the Lemon Court (403 U.S. at
612), “the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection” against—as an independent
Establishment Clause concern. For a critique of the Court’s reasoning in Zelman and an analysis of its
implications, see Gary J. Simson, School Vouchers and the Constitution — Permissible, Impermissible,
or Required?, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 566–76 (2002).
24
See Allegheny Cnty., 492 U.S. at 592; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
25
For a brief account of the Clauses’ historical roots, see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
8–14 (1947).
22
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Clauses differ in their immediate focus: while the Free Exercise Clause calls for
scrutiny of government interference with individuals’ exercise of religious liberty, the
Establishment Clause calls for scrutiny of government support of religion.
Nonetheless, at the heart of both Clauses is an ultimate objective of safeguarding
people’s freedom from government interference in making decisions for themselves
about religion (including decisions not to adhere to any religion).26 The
Establishment Clause prevents the state from making inroads on religious liberty
indirectly that the Free Exercise Clause prevents the state from achieving more
directly.27
To harmonize the two Clauses’ demands, the Lemon and endorsement tests
therefore must be understood as treating a purpose of complying with the demands
of the Free Exercise Clause as secular and nonreligious. Under this thinking, as long
as courts and legislatures go no further in seeking to protect religious liberty than the
Free Exercise Clause requires, the Establishment Clause does not present a problem.
If the Free Exercise Clause calls for carving out an exemption from a generally
applicable law, a court should do so when the issue arises. In addition, unless and
until a court has acted, the legislature may take the initiative and provide for such an
exemption itself.
The harder question is the extent, if any, to which government may rely on the
values underlying the Free Exercise Clause to justify affording greater protection to
religious liberty than the Free Exercise Clause demands. At what point does
government action promoting free exercise values cross the constitutional line and
become, in the words of the First Amendment, a forbidden “law respecting an
establishment of religion”? Though always important, that question acquired special
importance in 1990 when the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith28
revised its interpretation of the Clause in a way that substantially narrowed the scope
of the Clause’s demands. So doing, the Court greatly increased the incentive for
legislatures to press the boundaries of their authority to promote religious liberty and
for state courts to interpret their state constitutions’ free exercise clauses more
expansively.
26
See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48–55; Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 305–06 (Goldberg, J., joined by
Harlan, J., concurring); Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding
of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 809–12 (1978).
27
As Justice Black explained for the Court in holding that the N.Y. Board of Regents’ composition
of a prayer for recitation by the state’s schoolchildren violated the Establishment Clause:

The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form
of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain. . . .

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962).
28
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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For many years prior to Smith, the Court’s free exercise case law broadly
authorized courts to carve out exemptions from generally applicable laws that
substantially burden free exercise claimants’ ability to practice their religion. Unless
the state could show that requiring the free exercise claimant to abide by the law is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest, the court would carve out the requested
exemption.29 In rejecting a free exercise claim by members of the Native American
Church for an exemption from Oregon’s ban on peyote use, the Court in Smith
interpreted the Clause in a way that made judicial authority to carve out exemptions
from generally applicable laws very much the exception rather than the rule. Unless
a free exercise claimant could show that his or her claim seriously implicates free
exercise and another constitutional right30 or fits within some other narrow category
of claims treated as special by the Court in Smith,31 a court could no longer invoke
the Clause as authority to exempt the claimant from the requirements of a generally
applicable law.
Under the circumstances, if the government could not constitutionally give
religious liberty more protection than free exercise requires, the implications for
religious liberty would be bleak to say the least. However, on various occasions prior
to Smith, the Court had stated that government could be more protective of religious
liberty than the Free Exercise Clause requires,32 and the Court in Smith indicated
that it stood by that view. It pointed out that, as a matter of policy, various state
legislatures had created religious exemptions for peyote use, and it strongly implied
that if the Oregon legislature wished to follow their example, the Court would be
happy to approve.33
II. AN APPROACH TO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS—THE O’CONNOR FOUNDATION
The Court in Smith, as in prior years, offered no concrete guidance as to how far
beyond the dictates of free exercise government generally may go in the name of
protecting religious liberty. In the several years before Smith, however, one of the
Justices had taken on in earnest the task of providing such guidance. Not
coincidentally, that Justice was Sandra Day O’Connor—the Justice who
simultaneously was taking the lead on the Court in formulating the endorsement test
and articulating its theoretical foundation.34
29
See infra Parts VI.A & VII.A (discussing various decisions prior to Smith); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1109–10
(1990).
30
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (discussing “hybrid” cases).
31
See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41–53 (identifying
and discussing Smith’s “six overlapping exceptions and limitations”).
32
See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987); Walz v. Tax Comm’n,
397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
33
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
34
For an early appreciation of Justice O’Connor’s contributions in this regard, see Arnold H. Loewy,

Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped
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Concurring in a judgment striking down an Alabama moment-of-silence law
under the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor maintained in 1985:
On its face, the [Free Exercise] Clause is directed at government
interference with free exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly
assert that government pursues Free Exercise Clause values when it lifts a
government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute
falls within this category, then the standard Establishment Clause test
should be modified accordingly. . . . [T]he Court should simply
acknowledge that the religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by
the Free Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the effect
of such a statute—that is, in determining whether the statute conveys the
message of endorsement of religion or a particular religious belief—courts
should assume that the “objective observer” is acquainted with the Free
Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus individual perceptions,
or resentment that a religious observer is exempted from a particular
government requirement, would be entitled to little weight if the Free
Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption.35

In another concurring opinion two years later, Justice O’Connor applied, and further
articulated, the above approach:
The necessary first step in evaluating an Establishment Clause challenge
to a government action lifting from religious organizations a generally
applicable regulatory burden is to recognize that such government action
does have the effect of advancing religion. The necessary second step is to
separate those benefits to religion that constitutionally accommodate the
free exercise of religion from those that provide unjustifiable awards of
assistance to religious organizations. As I have suggested in earlier
opinions, the inquiry framed by the Lemon test should be “whether
government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute
actually conveys a message of endorsement.” Wallace, 472 U.S., at 69. . .
. [T]o perceive the government action as a permissible accommodation of
religion, there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the exercise of
religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action. The
determination whether the objective observer will perceive an
endorsement of religion “is . . . in large part a legal question to be answered
on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.” Lynch v. Donnelly
[465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)].36

Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986). Her most important opinions on
the endorsement test came in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67–84 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
35
36

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court in Amos rejected

an Establishment Clause challenge to the scope of an exemption that Congress had given religious
organizations from the federal statutory prohibition on religious discrimination in employment.
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Under Justice O’Connor’s approach, courts therefore should proceed as follows
to determine whether government action designed to further free exercise values
survives Establishment Clause scrutiny. Begin by asking whether such action takes
the form of lifting a government-imposed burden on free exercise. If it does not,
strike down the action for failing the purpose prong of the endorsement test, but if
it does, go on to the second prong of the endorsement test and ask whether an
objective observer would be likely to perceive the action as sending a message of
government preference for a particular religion or religious belief or for religion over
nonreligion. As discussed below, I believe Justice O’Connor’s approach could
usefully be clarified and expanded in some respects. Above all, however, I see it as a
major step forward toward a coherent and principled approach to a difficult problem
at the intersection of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.
First and foremost, Justice O’Connor’s threshold question of whether the
government action takes the form of lifting a government-imposed burden on free
exercise provides an appropriate and essential limiting principle. Government action
that seeks to promote free exercise by lifting a government-imposed burden on free
exercise has a distinctive claim to being based, at least in part, on a purpose other
than endorsing religion. For that reason, it also has a distinctive claim to satisfying
the purpose prong of the endorsement test, which demands only that the challenged
government action be based in part on some nonreligious purpose.37
At first glance, any government action that takes the form of lifting a
government-imposed burden on free exercise may appear to be an effort to favor
religion over nonreligion. It relieves religious adherents not only of the special burden
the law would impose on them due to their religious adherence but also of the secular
burden the law imposes on everyone within the scope of the law. Absent an
exemption, the religious adherents bear a heavier burden than others affected by the
law; with an exemption, they bear a lesser burden than others—in fact, no burden at
all.
The appearance of religious favoritism, however, is misleading. It is only part of
the picture. Yes, the government’s selective burden-lifting does have the effect of
leaving the religious beneficiaries of that burden-lifting in a much better position
than the one they would otherwise occupy and than the one occupied by those who
come within the broadly applicable terms of the law. To infer from that religionfavoring effect that the government’s selective burden-lifting is rooted in a purpose
of favoring religion—a purpose of endorsement—is eminently reasonable, but to
infer that it is rooted entirely in a purpose of favoring religion is not.
When the government acts to relieve individuals of a special burden that the
government was responsible for placing on them and that, as a result of sincere,
deeply held beliefs, they alone experience, the government action has an element of
neutrality to it that other types of free-exercise-promoting government action do not.
Almost invariably, the government had no way to relieve them of the religious
burden without relieving them of the secular one. Under the circumstances, the
37

See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
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government’s burden-lifting action is only fairly understood, not as an effort simply
designed to treat some people better because of their religion, but instead as an effort
designed at least in part to avoid treating some people worse because of their religion.
So understood, the government’s burden-lifting action readily satisfies the purpose
prong of the endorsement test.
If government action initiated for the purpose of promoting free exercise has no
such government-burden-lifting element to it, but instead simply takes the form of
incentivizing people to practice their religion or rewarding them for doing so, there
is no good reason to see the religion-favoring action as based on anything other than
a purpose of endorsing religion. Assume, for example, that Congress amends the tax
laws to provide that, in calculating their income taxes, parents can deduct the cost of
sending their child to an afterschool program only if the program is run by a religious
institution and has a substantial component of religious instruction or inculcation.
Such a deduction promotes free exercise values in a way that can only be sensibly
explained as an effort to favor religion. It therefore fails the purpose prong of the
endorsement test.
Also unable to satisfy the purpose prong are any government actions that seek to
promote free exercise values by lifting burdens that private actors have placed on
other people’s religious liberty. A good illustration is the Connecticut statute that the
Court in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.38 struck down under the Establishment
Clause. That statute sought to facilitate some employees’ ability to practice their
religion by prohibiting employers from requiring any employees to work on their
Sabbath. In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor underlined that the law was “not
the sort of accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the Free Exercise
Clause” because it “attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by
private employers.”39 Although a law seeking to promote free exercise values by lifting
a state-imposed burden on religious liberty can fairly be understood as an effort on
the part of the state to avoid disadvantaging some people because of their religion, a
law seeking to promote free exercise values by lifting a privately imposed burden on
religious liberty lacks any such neutrality. Connecticut could not reasonably argue
that its statute was an effort to level a playing field that it had made uneven.

38
472 U.S. 703 (1985). Professors Schwartzman, Schragger, and Tebbe have relied on Thornton as
authority for the proposition that “the government may not grant religious exemptions when they impose
significant burdens on non-beneficiaries.” Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The
Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html
[https://perma.cc/FYY9-AQVK].
They also have argued that United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), offers similar authority. Nelson
Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II:
What Counts as a Burden on Employees?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html [https://perma.cc/DTN8C7VQ]. I discuss Lee in detail infra text accompanying notes 176–85, 252–53.
39
Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor
maintained that the statute failed to meet the effects prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 711. The opinion of
the Court, which she joined, did the same. Id. at 708 (majority opinion). Neither opinion discussed
whether the statute satisfied the test’s purpose prong, which it almost certainly did not.
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Connecticut had done nothing to make Sabbath observance more cumbersome for
Sabbath-observers.
The statute under review was simply an effort to insulate from private constraints
one particular religious practice that the state apparently found especially worthy of
protection. However sensible or laudatory that purpose may have seemed to the
Connecticut legislature, it violates principles of nonendorsement in a variety of
ways. Most obviously, it simultaneously puts a state stamp of approval on:
Sabbath-observing religions over non-Sabbath-observing religions; Sabbath
observance over other practices of Sabbath-observing religions for which employees
might want employer accommodation; and employees’ religious needs for employer
accommodation over employees’ pressing nonreligious needs for employer
accommodation.40
III. AN APPROACH TO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS—BUILDING ON THE O’CONNOR FOUNDATION
For purposes of identifying which government actions initiated to promote
free exercise should survive Establishment Clause review, Justice O’Connor’s
threshold question of whether the government action takes the form of lifting a
government-imposed burden on free exercise serves a valuable screening function. It
screens out as violative of the endorsement test’s purpose prong any government
action designed to protect free exercise that does not lift a government-imposed
burden on religious liberty. So doing, however, it leaves standing virtually all religious
exemptions, including some that are most reasonably understood as sending a
message of endorsement. As indicated in the above excerpts, Justice O’Connor
provided for that possibility when she maintained that, even if government action
takes the form of lifting a government-imposed burden on free exercise, it still must
satisfy the effects prong of the endorsement test.
I suggest that, to decide whether an exemption has the effect of endorsing
religion, a court should proceed as follows:
1. Determine whether the exemption relieves the religious adherent(s) whom
it benefits of a substantial burden on religious liberty.
2. If the exemption relieves the religious adherent(s) whom it benefits of only
an insubstantial burden on religious liberty, determine whether there is a rational
basis for denying the exemption and requiring the exempted adherent(s) to abide by
the generally applicable terms of the law.
40
In her opinion in Thornton, Justice O’Connor explicitly left room for laws lifting privately imposed
burdens on religious liberty to be defended successfully in terms of purposes other than promoting free
exercise values. Pointing to the protection that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides against
religious and other discrimination by private employers, she maintained that “a statute outlawing
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has the valid secular
purpose of assuring employment opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society.” Id. at 712 (O’Connor,
J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). However, that concession did not help, and should not have helped,
salvage the Connecticut law under review in Thornton.
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a. If so, the exemption has the effect of endorsing religion and should be
struck down.
b. If not, the exemption does not have the effect of endorsing religion and
should be upheld.
3. If the exemption was not created by the legislature and relieves the religious
adherent(s) whom it benefits of a substantial burden on religious liberty, determine
whether denying the exemption and requiring the exempted adherent(s) to abide by
the generally applicable terms of the law is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest.
a. If so, the exemption has the effect of endorsing religion and should be
struck down.
b. If not, the exemption does not have the effect of endorsing religion and
should be upheld.
4. If the exemption was created by the legislature and relieves the religious
adherent(s) whom it benefits of a substantial burden on religious liberty, determine
whether the legislature had a substantial basis for believing that denying the
exemption and requiring the exempted adherent(s) to abide by the generally
applicable terms of the law is not necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
a. If so, the exemption does not have the effect of endorsing religion and
should be upheld.
b. If not, the exemption has the effect of endorsing religion and should be
struck down.
In Parts VI and VII, I will focus on the meaning of “substantial burden” and
“necessary to a compelling state interest” as used in the above approach. For now, I
would like to comment briefly on the bigger picture—the basic framework that the
approach puts into place, and two assumptions that are not spelled out in the
approach but that underlie and inform it.
First, the two assumptions:
1. Absent special circumstances, a reasonable observer is likely to perceive a
religious exemption as sending a message of government endorsement of religion.
2. Special circumstances exist only if there is no constitutionally adequate
justification for holding the exempted religious adherent(s) to the generally
applicable terms of the law.
The first assumption is essentially a presumption of endorsement. A religious
exemption relieves the exempted religious adherent(s) of both the religious and the
secular burdens imposed by the law. As a result, it invariably leaves the exempted
religious adherent(s) better off than those covered by the law, who continue to bear
its secular burdens. In and of itself, the religious exemption sends a message of
government endorsement of religion that a reasonable observer cannot help but
notice. But that message is not irrebuttable. The second assumption states the special
circumstances that can rebut and dispel the message of government endorsement of
religion sent by any religious exemption. Those circumstances are ones where there
is no constitutionally sufficient justification for keeping the law’s burden on the
exempted religious adherent(s).
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The operation of the proposed approach obviously turns to a great extent on the
determination of whether the burden on religion lifted by the exemption is
substantial or insubstantial. If the religious burden lifted by the exemption is
insubstantial, the exemption violates the Establishment Clause unless there is no
rational basis for holding the exempted religious adherent(s) to the generally
applicable terms of the law. In other words, the exemption falls unless not
creating the exemption would be utterly senseless—thoroughly inexplicable in terms
of any lawful government interest, however insignificant in importance. As a
practical matter, the odds that a religious exemption will survive review under that
standard are extremely low.
In calling for that standard of review when a religious exemption lifts only an
insubstantial burden, the proposed approach draws on the Supreme Court’s
fundamental rights case law. Expressly and implicitly, the Court has applied rational
basis review to decide the constitutionality of laws burdening only insubstantially the
enjoyment of fundamental rights of various sorts.41 The Court’s thinking appears to
be that an insubstantial burden on a fundamental right is constitutionally
inconsequential and does not call for more than the very minimal level of justification
required by the Due Process Clause when the state deprives individuals of a liberty
or property interest of no particular constitutional importance.42
41
See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (freedoms of expression
and association); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (voting); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (free speech); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (abortion); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (privacy interests of nondisclosure and personal autonomy); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (interstate travel, and access to divorce courts); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (equal
process in criminal cases).
42
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), offers a classic statement and application of
the rational basis test. An Oklahoma statute essentially barred opticians from either fitting old glasses into
new frames or making lenses unless they had a prescription from an ophthalmologist or an optometrist.
Not long after its enactment, the statute was challenged in Oklahoma federal district court as denying due
process to opticians, and the court struck down the law as not “reasonably and rationally related to the
health and welfare of the people.” Lee Optical, Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 136 (W.D. Okla.
1954) (3-judge court), rev’d, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Conceding that the Oklahoma statute “may exact a
needless, wasteful requirement in many cases,” the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Douglas made clear that the rational basis test is much less demanding than the lower court had assumed:

[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement. It appears that in many cases the optician can easily supply the new frames or new
lenses without reference to the old written prescription. . . . The legislature might have
concluded that the frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to
justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses. Likewise, when it is necessary to duplicate a
lens, a written prescription may or may not be necessary. But the legislature might have
concluded that one was needed often enough to require one in every case. Or the legislature
may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but
also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and every
duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert. . . . But
the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.

348 U.S. at 487–88.
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In keeping with that approach to insubstantial burdens on fundamental
rights, the government is fully justified in holding any insubstantially burdened
religious adherent(s) to the generally applicable terms of the law when it has a
rational basis for doing so, which almost invariably will be the case. Extrapolating
from that context to one in which the government has created an exemption in favor
of any insubstantially burdened religious adherent(s), the proposed approach
recognizes the validity of such an exemption when there is no rational basis for
denying it. Otherwise, however, the proposed approach treats any such exemptions
as religious favoritism—favoritism that crosses the line into territory forbidden by
the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on government endorsement of religion.
If a court determines that the burden on religion lifted by the exemption is
substantial, then, under the proposed approach, the court decides the exemption’s
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause by a very different inquiry: Is
denying the exemption and holding the exempted religious adherent(s) to the
generally applicable terms of the law necessary to serve a compelling state interest?
Or, to state the question in a somewhat different and perhaps more easily answered
way: Does the exemption substantially detract from the government’s ability to serve
as well as possible a compelling state interest that the law’s generally applicable terms
are designed to serve? Under either formulation of the question, the exemption
violates the Establishment Clause if the answer is “yes” and survives Establishment
Clause review if the answer is “no.” Under the proposed approach, an exemption for
any religious adherent(s) who, if held to the law’s generally applicable terms, would
be substantially burdened religiously is hardly a sure bet to survive Establishment
Clause review, but it is much more likely to do so than an exemption for any religious
adherent(s) who, if held to the law’s general terms, would only be insubstantially
burdened.
Although the proposed approach calls for two very different standards of review
for religious exemptions depending on whether the exempted person(s) would be
substantially or insubstantially burdened religiously if held to the law’s generally
applicable terms, the two standards of review derive from a common source: the
Supreme Court’s fundamental rights case law. With substantial burdens at issue, the
Court’s case law pertaining to a variety of fundamental rights has made
satisfaction of the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test the yardstick for
constitutionality.43 In setting the bar that high, the Court obviously is using a
balancing approach—balancing the constitutional harm experienced by the
individual against the government’s justification for inflicting such harm. With harm
of exceptional gravity—serious impairment of an individual interest of the highest
order—the Court regards the state’s justification as adequate only if such justification

43
See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (interstate travel); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (free speech); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
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is at its apogee—a state interest of the highest order that cannot be served as
effectively by alternative means that impose a lesser burden on individual rights.
Under that approach to substantial burdens on fundamental rights, the
government’s justification for substantially burdening some people’s religious liberty
is constitutionally adequate—commensurate with the constitutional harm
done—only if the government’s imposition of that burden is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest. Extrapolating from that context to one in which the
government has granted an exemption to avoid imposing a substantial burden on
religious liberty, the proposed approach upholds the exemption unless denying the
exemption is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. To put it somewhat
differently, if the exemption substantially detracts from the government’s ability to
serve as well as possible a compelling state interest that the law is designed to serve,
the exemption cannot survive Establishment Clause review.
The fourth and final step of my proposed approach prescribes a moderate degree
of judicial deference for legislatively created exemptions. Step 4 assumes that the
constitutionality of an exemption that lifts a substantial burden should be decided by
the same standard of review – is denying the exemption necessary to serve a
compelling state interest? – regardless of whether the exemption is made by a court
or legislature. However, it also instructs the court to give the legislature the benefit
of the doubt and uphold a legislative exemption when the constitutionality of a
legislative exemption under the applicable standard of review presents a close
question.
I suggest that the prescribed deference is an appropriate concession by the
judiciary to the legislature’s judgment on two matters in which it can fairly claim
special expertise: the compellingness of the state interest and the necessity of the
means-end fit. As the author of both the law and the exemption, the legislature has
a special familiarity with, and understanding of, the objectives underlying the law
and the extent to which the exemption may detract from the law’s effectuation of
those objectives. In upholding under Step 4 an exemption that presents a close
question under the applicable standard of review, a court defers to the legislative
judgment implicit in the legislature’s creation of the exemption that holding those
exempted to the generally applicable terms of the law is not necessary to serve a
compelling state interest.
I underline that the prescribed degree of deference is much less than it would be
if the relevant inquiry were framed in terms of whether the legislature had a rational,
as opposed to substantial, basis for believing that denying the exemption is not
necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Framing the inquiry in terms of a
substantial basis insulates from invalidation some legislative exemptions that a court
might strike down if they were court-made, but a much narrower range than if the
inquiry were framed in terms of a rational basis. In my view, the substantial basis
inquiry gives the legislative expertise that justifies treating legislative and judicial
exemptions differently roughly the weight it deserves, no more and no less. A
legislature is better suited than a court to decide whether a legislative exemption is
apt to undermine significantly the realization of a compelling state interest, but it is
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not so much better suited to warrant framing the relevant judicial inquiry in rational,
rather than substantial, basis terms.
Lastly, I call attention to two determinations pertaining to the constitutionality
of legislative exemptions that my proposed approach treats very differently than the
determination that is the focus of Step 4. First, the proposed approach leaves to
independent judicial determination whether a burden on free exercise lifted by a
legislative exemption is substantial or insubstantial. The approach makes no attempt
to build in deference to any implicit or express legislative judgment about the
burden’s substantiality. In my view, the question whether a lifted burden is
substantial is one to which the legislature brings no more expertise than the judiciary.
It focuses on impact on individuals – a matter that, in terms of relative institutional
competence, appears to lie more within the domain of courts than legislatures. In
any event, the judicial deference that seems very appropriate in Step 4 seems very out
of place in a determination of a burden’s substantiality.
Secondly, Step 2, which treats exemptions lifting insubstantial burdens no
differently depending on whether they are legislatively or judicially made, prescribes
no deference to the implicit legislative judgment that a legislative exemption meets
the applicable standard of review. Under Step 2, that standard is whether the state
has a rational basis for denying the exemption. I suggest that the legislature has no
greater claim than the judiciary to special expertise in determining whether that
standard is met. In addition, because so very little is required to show a rational basis,
I suggest that a determination that there is no rational basis for denying an exemption
is such an extreme, black-and-white judgment that there is little, if any, room for
close questions on constitutionality to exist. For Step 2 to leave the determination of
a legislative exemption’s constitutionality to the judiciary with no intimation that
some deference to the legislature may be in order therefore seems entirely warranted.
IV. A NOTE ON PRECEDENT
I propose the above approach as one that addresses in a principled and effective
way a difficult problem that epitomizes what the Supreme Court has characterized
as the “tension” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.44 I believe it
could be adopted without major disruption to precedent, but in light of space
limitations, I make no serious attempt to prove that here. However, two Supreme
Court decisions, Employment Division v. Smith45 and Cutter v. Wilkinson,46 bear
so directly and centrally on the issue at hand that it seems only appropriate before
proceeding further to comment on the extent to which they militate for or against
adoption of my approach.
At first glance, it may appear that my approach and Justice Scalia’s opinion for
the 5-4 majority in Smith can only coexist in alternate universes. After all, my
44

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
494 U.S. 872 (1990), discussed supra text accompanying notes 11–14, 28–33.
46
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
45
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approach assigns importance to two determinations—whether a burden on free
exercise is substantial, and whether a necessary-to-a-compelling-interest standard of
review is met—that lie at the heart of the pre-Smith free exercise balancing test that
the Court in Smith not only greatly curtailed in range of application but even seemed
unwilling to concede was ever really the Court’s principal approach.47
The Smith Court’s repudiation of the preexisting balancing test, however, was
not an all-purpose repudiation. Rather, it was a repudiation of courts’ using the test
to resolve a question of Free Exercise Clause constraints. It is not inconsistent with
Smith to use an approach that borrows key ingredients of that test to resolve a very
distinctive question of Establishment Clause constraints.
Fifteen years after Smith, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a unanimous Court in
Cutter provided some basis for optimism that the Court might be receptive to an
approach like mine. The Court upheld the constitutionality on its face of the portion
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 that
prohibits state-run prisons, mental hospitals, and the like from “impos[ing] a
substantial burden on the religious exercise” of any institutionalized persons unless
doing so is the “least restrictive means” of serving a “compelling governmental
interest.”48 RLUIPA was the result of three related developments: (1) Smith’s
dramatic narrowing of individuals’ ability to seek free exercise exemptions; (2)
Congress’s enactment in 1993 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 49
to essentially reverse Smith and reinstate the preexisting approach; and (3) the
Court’s holding in 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores50 that RFRA is unconstitutional
as applied to state and local government. According to the Court in Boerne, in
enacting RFRA as a limitation on state and local governmental action, Congress
exceeded the scope of its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment—the source of constitutional authority upon which it had relied. 51

47

In that and other ways, the opinion that the Court in Smith offered to justify abandoning a
longstanding approach was stunningly disingenuous – perhaps most useful as an example to new judges
as to what to be sure not to do. Some who applaud Smith’s sharp curtailment of courts’ latitude under the
Free Exercise Clause to carve out religious exemptions have gone to lengths to disassociate themselves
from the Court’s opinion. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308–09 (1991) (“The decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor
well-crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise jurisprudence and its use of precedent
borders on fiction.”).
48
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2018).
49
Id. §§ 2000bb to bb-4.
50
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
51
Section Five provides: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The “provisions of this article” to which it refers
are primarily those stating, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” Id. § 1. Although Congress’s reliance on Section Five is not explicitly stated in the text of
RFRA, it is clearly indicated in the House and Senate Reports. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516. Congress
did not need to rely on its Section Five authority to enact RFRA as a limitation on federal governmental
action.
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In enacting RLUIPA, Congress used two tactics to avoid the type of
lack-of-power objection that the Court found so probative in Boerne. It drafted a
statute encompassing a much narrower range of government activities—only ones
giving rise to religious land use claims or institutionalized persons’ religious exercise
claims—than was encompassed by RFRA. In addition, it relied on grants of
congressional authority—the Commerce Clause52 and the Taxing and Spending
Clause53—much less controversially related to the activities covered by the Act.54
The standard that Congress adopted in RLUIPA for deciding individual claims,
however, was identical to the one codified in RFRA, which mirrored the standard
that the Supreme Court had been using before Smith to decide claims for free
exercise exemptions.55 The Court in Boerne had not addressed the question of
whether Congress’s reinstatement in RFRA of the pre-Smith standard overstepped
the bounds of the Establishment Clause. Nor had the Court in the years between
Boerne and Cutter had occasion to address that question in deciding a claim for a
RFRA exemption from a federal law, because the Court heard no RFRA cases during
those years.56 It was not until Cutter that the Court ever addressed the
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of Congress’s codifying the preSmith standard.
In holding that RLUIPA’s promotion of free exercise values by authorizing
court-ordered exemptions does not overstep Establishment Clause limits, the Court
in Cutter emphasized that RLUIPA makes exemptions available only to claimants
seeking to lift a weighty burden that the government has placed on their religious
liberty. “Foremost,” according to the Court, RLUIPA “alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise.”57 In addition, the Court
underlined that RLUIPA restrains courts from siding automatically with claimants
who can prove weighty burdens on their religious liberty. Rather, courts must give
due regard to weighty government justifications for refusing to alleviate even weighty
burdens. In particular, as the Court explained, courts must not “elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order
and safety,”58 and they also must be mindful of the government’s interest in avoiding
“the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”59
Altogether, from the Court’s perspective, RLUIPA is a mandate for “measured,” not
52

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. cl. 1.
54
RLUIPA invokes Congress’s authority under the two clauses in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(B)
(2018).
55
See id. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a) (RLUIPA); id. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (RFRA);, McConnell,
supra note 29, at 1109–10 (discussing pre-Smith case law).
56
When the Court in the year after Cutter finally decided a RFRA case, Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), it upheld the claim for a RFRA exemption without any mention of the
Establishment Clause. It did the same in its next RFRA case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
57
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
58
Id. at 722.
59
Id. at 720.
53
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one-sided, decisionmaking, and there is “no cause to believe that RLUIPA would
not be applied in an appropriately balanced way.”60
My proposed approach to Establishment Clause limitations on religious
exemptions has much in common with the Court’s reasoning in Cutter. In fact, it
has enough in common that I am tempted to claim that, for all practical purposes,
the Court has already signed off on it. For a couple of reasons, though, I am content
to claim simply that my approach is compatible with Cutter and derives at least
moderate support from it. First, because the Court in Cutter upholds rather than
strikes down RLUIPA, there is some ambiguity as to whether the Court regards all
of the factors it mentions as essential to upholding the law or whether it might come
out the same way even if one or more of those factors were different. Second, because
RLUIPA itself speaks in terms of “substantial burden,” “compelling governmental
interest,” and “least restrictive means,”61 it is unclear whether the Court’s
Establishment Clause analysis in Cutter speaks in the same or comparable terms
because those are the terms that would be central to the Court’s Establishment
Clause analysis of any law that seeks to promote free exercise values. Perhaps, instead,
the use of the same or comparable terms in the Court’s opinion simply reflects the
fact that the Court is focusing on a statute using such terms, and the Court would
frame its analysis in very different terms if the law at hand spoke in terms quite unlike
those in RLUIPA.
V. BENCHMARKS
Under my proposed approach, a great deal turns on whether the burden on
religious liberty lifted by an exemption is “substantial.” Moreover, if that burden is
substantial, the exemption’s fate under the Establishment Clause depends on
whether denying the exemption serves a government interest that ranks as
“compelling” and whether the means-end relationship between denying the
exemption and a compelling government interest qualifies as “necessary.” In some
instances, a burden on free exercise is so obviously substantial or insubstantial that a
judge can decide substantiality without giving much thought to what criteria ought
to guide the decision. The same is true for judicial determinations of the compelling
or uncompelling nature of a government interest and the necessary or unnecessary
character of the means-end relationship. Often, however, deciding one of these
matters requires more subtle judgment and needs to be approached in a less intuitive
and more structured way. With the magnitude of the burden in question, the court
essentially must locate the burden along a spectrum of burdens of greater and lesser
magnitude, and to do so, it needs some benchmarks to help it identify, with
reasonable objectivity and consistency, the point along the spectrum at which a
burden becomes sufficient in magnitude to merit the characterization of
“substantial.” With the importance of the government interest or relationship
60

Id. at 722.

61

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2018).
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between means and end in question, the court’s task and the need for benchmarks
are much the same.
I suggest that the most logical source for benchmarks is the Supreme Court’s and
lower courts’ case law of federal free exercise during the era of free exercise balancing
that preceded Smith. That suggestion may seem counterintuitive in light of the
Smith Court’s sharp change in direction from the prior case law and adoption of a
different course largely devoid of judicial balancing.62 The Smith Court’s rejection of
free exercise balancing, however, was a rejection of an approach, not of the
determinations made in free exercise cases before Smith as to each of the factors in
the balance. Smith by no means consigned those determinations to the junk heap,
and they retain significant value today.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for a unanimous Court in 2006 in Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal63 goes a long way toward dispelling
any possible doubt on the matter. O Centro Espirita was the Court’s first decision
applying RFRA. As noted earlier,64 RFRA, the federal statute enacted in direct
response to Smith, includes language tracking the pre-Smith balancing test, and the
Court in 1997 held that it could constitutionally be applied only to federal, not state
and local, governmental actions. O Centro Espirita involved a RFRA claim by the
small U.S. branch of a Brazilian-based religion that uses in its ceremonies a particular
hallucinogen. The claimant sought an exemption from the federal statute barring any
use of that substance. The government did not contest that the claimant was
substantially burdened by the prohibition – a prerequisite under RFRA for any
claimant to be granted an exemption.65 However, the government maintained that it
could show that denying the claimed exemption was necessary to serve a compelling
state interest – the showing required by RFRA to justify imposing a substantial
burden.66
In holding that the government had failed to make that required showing, the
Court looked to several pre-Smith free exercises cases for guidance. Not surprisingly,
the first two that it discussed were Sherbert v. Verner67 and Wisconsin v. Yoder68—
the two decisions that Congress, in its statement of purposes in RFRA, had
specifically named as exemplifying the standard of review it had in mind.69 Later in

62

See supra text accompanying notes 28–33, 47.

63

546 U.S. 418 (2006).
See supra text accompanying notes 49–51, 55.
65
“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2018).
66
“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1(b) (2018).
67
374 U.S. 398 (1963), discussed infra text accompanying notes 105–08, 161–68.
68
406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed infra text accompanying notes 109-15, 169-75. For the Court’s
discussion of Sherbert and Yoder in O Centro Espirita, see 546 U.S. at 431.
69
“The purposes of this chapter are (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
64
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the opinion, however, the Court dispelled any possible misimpression that it was
willing to give credence to pre-Smith free exercise decisions only if Congress
specifically instructed it to do so. It discussed three more pre-Smith decisions for the
light that they shed on the rigor with which the articulated standard of review should
be applied.70
Perhaps even more striking, as an affirmation of the continued importance of the
pre-Smith free exercise decisions, is the Court’s discussion of one of those decisions
in its next RFRA case – the well-known Affordable Care Act exemption case,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.71 In enacting the ACA, Congress required a
wide range of employers to provide their employees with “a group health plan or
group health insurance coverage” that offers “minimum essential coverage.”72
Congress made clear in the ACA that the requisite minimum coverage includes
“preventive care” for women, but left it to a unit of the Department of Health and
Human Services to promulgate regulations making that mandate more specific.73
Hobby Lobby and two other closely held for-profit corporations, all firmly opposed
to abortion on religious grounds, brought suit under RFRA seeking an exemption
from the regulations insofar as the regulations call for coverage of certain
contraceptive methods that work in a way that, in the plaintiffs’ view, constitutes
inducing abortion. In ruling by a 5-4 margin for the RFRA claimants, the Court in
an opinion by Justice Alito found that the essential elements for relief set forth in
RFRA were met: each claimant was a “person” whose religious exercise was being
“substantially burden[ed]” by the federal government, and the government could not
show that denying an exemption to the plaintiffs was “the least restrictive means” of
serving a “compelling governmental interest.”74

application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)
(2018).
70
O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 435-37. The additional pre-Smith decisions that the Court
discussed are Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). Braunfeld and Lee are discussed infra text
accompanying
notes
97–104, 179–85, 252–53.
71
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Although I focus on two Supreme Court applications of RFRA, other
federal courts’ applications of RFRA also illustrate the continued importance of the pre-Smith free
exercise precedent. See, e.g.,Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2014) (relying on
Sherbert and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)); Kremmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 684–
85 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (relying on Sherbert, Yoder, and Braunfeld); Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 17780 (3d Cir. 1999) (relying on Lee and Hernandez). As noted supra note 55 and accompanying text,
Congress codified in RLUIPA the same balancing formula as the one it had used in RFRA. RLUIPA
decisions also illustrate the pre-Smith cases’ continued significance. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct.
853, 863, 866 (2015) (relying on Sherbert and Thomas); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366
F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (relying on Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
72
26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2); 5000A(f)(2) (2018).
73
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2018).
74
The words in quotation marks are the words used in RFRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2018)
(quoted supra notes 65–66).
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In finding that the claimants qualified as “persons” under RFRA despite being
for-profit corporations, the Court placed considerable weight on two of its
pre-Smith free exercise balancing decisions.75 Especially noteworthy for present
purposes, however, is the Court’s detailed attention later in the opinion to another
pre-Smith decision, United States v. Lee.76 At that point, the Court’s focus was on
whether the government had made the “least restrictive means” showing required by
RFRA to justify substantially burdening the claimants’ religious exercise.77 Earlier in
the opinion the Court had stated that RFRA’s least-restrictive-means requirement
“went beyond” the means-end requirement in the pre-Smith free exercise cases and
“provided even broader protection for religious liberty.”78 Under that view of “least
restrictive means,” the government, in order to justify not exempting substantially
burdened individuals, must show a stronger means-end connection than it had been
obliged to show under the pre-Smith balancing test.79
In and of itself, that interpretation of RFRA’s least-restrictive-means
requirement is baffling to say the least. Perhaps most obviously, although the term,
“least restrictive means,” was not invariably used in the Court’s pre-Smith free
exercise cases to specify the means-end connection needed to justify not lifting a
substantial burden on religious liberty, it certainly was used at times;80 and when it
was used, it was used with no apparent intent to mean anything any different than
was meant by the several other terms, such as “necessary” or “essential” means,81 used
75
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767, 2769-70 (discussing Braunfeld); id. at 2772–73 (discussing
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961)).
76
455 U.S. 282 (1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 179–85, 252–53.
77
The Court explicitly declined to decide whether the government had shown the requisite
“compelling governmental interest.” Instead, the Court assumed for purposes of argument that the
government had done so and then focused on whether the least-restrictive-means requirement had been
met. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
78
Id. at 2761 n.3, 2767 n.18.
79
The majority and dissent’s somewhat heated exchange as to the meaning of “least restrictive means”
in RFRA leaves no doubt that this was the majority’s understanding of that term. Compare Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3, 2767 n.18 (majority opinion), with id. at 2792–93 & n.11 (Ginsburg, J., joined by
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting)
80
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Although Sherbert, one of the two pre-Smith cases explicitly cited in RFRA for
the applicable standard of review, does not use the precise term, “least restrictive means,” it uses a
formulation that is plainly synonymous After assuming for purposes of argument that the state had a
compelling interest in avoiding “spurious claims” for unemployment compensation, the Court held that
the means-end connection needed to justify denying the requested religious exemption did not exist
because the state could not “demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
81
See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (“essential”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)
(“necessary”). For other formulations, see, for example, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480
U.S. 136. 141 (1987) (emphasis added) (“[I]nfringements [of free exercise] must be subjected to strict
scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). The Court’s use in
the pre-Smith free exercise case law of “least restrictive means” interchangeably with terms such as
“necessary” or “essential” means was very much in keeping with its use of “least restrictive means” (or
obviously synonymous terms, see supra note 80 ) in other areas of constitutional law. For example, with
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in those cases to indicate the requisite means-end connection. If Congress indeed
intended to codify in RFRA a more exacting means-end requirement than the one
that was part of the pre-Smith balancing test, why would it choose a term to describe
that distinctive requirement that was one of several terms used interchangeably in
the pre-Smith case law to describe the requisite means-end connection in the
pre-Smith balancing test?82

regard to the means-end connection required by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause to justify
content-based restrictions on speech, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015)
(emphasis added) (“[Such restrictions] can stand only if they survive strict scrutiny, which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. . . . The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is
necessary [to serve its interest]. . . .”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (emphasis added)
(“[T]he court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available,
effective alternatives.”). Similarly, as to the means-end relationship that the state must show to defeat a
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to a racial classification:

[S]trict scrutiny must be applied to any admissions program using racial categories or
classifications. . . . [T]he reviewing court [must] verify that it is “necessary” for a university to
use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity. . . The reviewing court must ultimately
be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits
of diversity. . . .

Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. 297, 310, 312 (2013) (emphasis added).
82
This is not the place for me to explain in detail all the reasons that I find so dubious the Hobby
Lobby Court’s interpretation of RFRA’s least-restrictive-means requirement. It may be useful, though,
for me to discuss briefly two more.
First, that interpretation is very hard to reconcile with the fact that Congress provided in the
“Purposes” subsection of RFRA that it was seeking to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b)(1) (2018). Congress’s use of “restore” seems unambiguous – i.e., “to put or bring back into
existence or use,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restore. In light of the strong negative
reaction to Smith across the political spectrum – a reaction that plainly fueled the passage of RFRA within
a few years – it makes eminent good sense to understand Congress as saying, when it enacted RFRA in
1993, that it wished to bring back into existence the means-end and government interest requirements
that existed in the era exemplified by Sherbert and Yoder. On the other hand, if, as the Court in Hobby
Lobby maintained, Congress in RFRA intended to put in place a means-end requirement different from
the one reflected in Sherbert, Yoder, and the Court’s other pre-Smith free exercise case law, its choice of
words was incongruous. (Note that although RFRA does not include a definition of “compelling interest
test” in its “Definitions” section, id. §2000bb-2, it clearly is using that term in the Act’s Purposes
subsection as a shorthand for “compelling governmental interest” and “least restrictive alternative” – the
standard-of-review requirements set forth in id. §2000bb-1.)
Second, as authority for its interpretation of “least restrictive means,” the Court in Hobby Lobby
relied on some language in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997), the decision holding that Congress lacked constitutional authority under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to bind state and local governments by the constraints set
forth in RFRA. “In City of Boerne v. Flores,” the Court in Hobby Lobby stated, “we wrote that RFRA’s
‘least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to
codify.’” 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3. The language quoted from Boerne was part of a sentence that reads, “In
addition, the Act imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement – a requirement that was not
used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify – which also indicates that the legislation
is broader than is appropriate if the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.” Boerne, 521
U.S. at 535.
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Be that as it may, the important point for present purposes is that, given the

Hobby Lobby Court’s interpretation of the least-drastic-means requirement, the
deference that it showed to United States v. Lee,83 a pre-Smith free exercise decision,
sent a strong message that the pre-Smith case law continued to be of importance.
The Court in Hobby Lobby went on at considerable length explaining why its
finding in the case at hand that the government had not met the RFRA means-end
requirement should be seen as consistent with its finding in Lee that the government
in that case had met the free exercise means-end requirement.84 “Lee was a free
exercise, not a RFRA, case,” the Court noted, “but if the issue in Lee were analyzed
under the RFRA framework, the fundamental point would be that there simply is
no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes [from which
Lee sought an exemption].”85 If, however, as the Court in Hobby Lobby maintained,
the RFRA means-end requirement is more demanding than the one applied in Lee
and other pre-Smith free exercise cases, the Court in Hobby Lobby had no real
obligation to explain why the government would not prevail in Hobby Lobby even
though it had prevailed in Lee. After all, the natural assumption would be that the
difference in means-end requirements explains the difference in results.
Perhaps the Hobby Lobby Court’s eagerness to reconcile its resolution of the case
at hand with the result in Lee to some extent reflected reticence on the part of one
or more of the Justices in the majority to put much weight on the notion that the
RFRA and pre-Smith means-end requirements really are different. At a minimum,
though, it is hard to see the Court’s rather extended effort to reconcile the results of
the two cases under the same standard as anything but an affirmation that Lee and
the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise case law as a whole remain very relevant today.86
The Court in Hobby Lobby may have been correct in interpreting the rather vague language that it
quoted from Boerne to mean that RFRA imposed a stronger means-end requirement than existed in the
pre-Smith balancing test. It is very doubtful, however, that the quoted language deserved nearly as much
weight as the Court in Hobby Lobby gave it. It was not a summation of any discussion that preceded or
followed it in the Court’s opinion. Nor was it accompanied by any sort of documentation. Instead, it was
simply a mid-sentence observation of the sort that, in an opinion spanning twenty-five pages in the U.S.
Reports, probably reflected relatively little thought on the part of the Justice who authored it and even less
on the part of the Justices who joined the opinion.
Indeed, if the quoted language from Boerne was as meaningful as the Hobby Lobby Court
maintained, one would have expected that, nine years after Boerne and eight years before Hobby Lobby,
the unanimous Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), discussed supra text
accompanying
notes
63-70, would not have been so inattentive to it. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts not only did
not refer to that language when he described the RFRA test; he described the test in terms – RFRA“adopts
a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith,” id. at 424 – that belie the notion
that there was anything at all novel about its means-end requirement.
83
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
84
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783–84.
85
Id. at 2784.
86
The Court in Hobby Lobby gave no indication that it saw any possible constitutional problems
with interpreting RFRA’s means-end requirement not only as more rigorous than the means-end
requirement in the pre-Smith free exercise precedent but as much more rigorous. It described the RFRA
requirement as “exceptionally demanding,” id. at 2780 – a description that, as I discuss infra text
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Lastly, as further support for the logic of looking to the pre-Smith case law for
benchmarks to guide application of my proposed approach, I would like to offer an
analogy. I suggest that the Supreme Court’s and lower courts’ determinations prior
to Smith of whether burdens were substantial, government interests were
compelling, and means-end relationships were necessary remained meaningful
after Smith in much the same way as the body of federal general common law
developed under Swift v. Tyson87 continued to be meaningful even after Swift

accompanying notes 176-78, 216-25, few observers would use to characterize the pre-Smith Court’s
application of the free exercise balancing test’s means-end requirement.
Writing in dissent in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg raised constitutional concerns with what she
called the Court’s “immoderate reading of RFRA.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., joined
by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissenting). In her view, the Court had “ventured into a minefield,”
and the mines lurking beneath the surface were a host of Establishment Clause problems. Id. She denied
that RFRA’s least-restrictive-means requirement was intended to be more demanding than the
means-end requirement in the pre-Smith case law, and she maintained that “[m]isguided by its errant
premise that RFRA moved beyond the pre-Smith case law,” the Court “falters” not only in deciding
whether the least-restrictive-means requirement is met but “at each step of its analysis.” Id. at
2792–93. From her perspective, the Hobby Lobby Court was able to find a substantial burden on the
claimants’ religious liberty only because it was working with a conception of “substantial burden”
significantly more protective of religious exercise than the conception reflected in the Court’s
pre-Smith case law. By the same token, in her view, the Court was able to find that the government had
not met the least-restrictive-means requirement only because it was working with a conception of that
requirement significantly more protective of religious exercise than the conception reflected in the Court’s
pre-Smith case law.
I believe Justice Ginsburg’s warning that an “immoderate reading of RFRA” raises serious
Establishment Clause concerns is very apt. Does affording religious exercise substantially more protection
than it would be afforded under the pre-Smith free exercise balancing test raise serious Establishment
Clause concerns? As indicated in the remainder of this Article, I believe the answer is “yes.” Was the
Court in Hobby Lobby so protective of religious exercise that, in ordering an exemption for the plaintiffs,
it essentially ordered an Establishment Clause violation? That depends on whether the magnitude of the
burden and the relationship between means and end are best understood as Justice Ginsburg or the Court
understood them. Both issues prompted not only extensive debate between the majority and dissent in
Hobby Lobby, but also a range of views among commentators, see, e.g.,Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby
Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014); Ira S. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of
Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35 (2015); William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make
Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71; Eric Rassbach, Is Hobby Lobby Really a
Brave New World? Litigation Truths About Religious Exercise by For-Profit Organizations, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (2015), and it is beyond the scope of this Article to stake out and defend a
position on the issues.
For now, I only underline that from the Hobby Lobby Court’s perspective, the resolution of both
issues did not present a close question. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (majority opinion) (“If these
consequences do not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.”); id. (“[I]n order for
the HHS mandate to be sustained, it must also constitute the least restrictive means of serving that
interest, and the mandate plainly fails that test.”). In the Court’s view, the validity of granting the
requested exemption did not turn on interpreting the burden and means-end requirements under RFRA
any differently than the pre-Smith precedent had interpreted those requirements under the Free Exercise
Clause. The dissent plainly disagreed.
87
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift limited federal diversity courts’ lawmaking authority to questions
of “general,” rather than “local,” law. On the “particularly elusive” nature of that distinction, see CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 54 (8th ed. 2017).
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came under the “sledge-hammer blows”88 of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.89
Even though the Court in Erie repudiated Swift’s basic approach to the
lawmaking authority of federal courts in diversity cases, the Court subsequently
has drawn on the Swift-era precedents in fashioning federal common law to
resolve issues that are “essentially of a federal character”90 but not covered by the
Constitution or a federal statute.91 In a similar vein, even though Smith repudiated
the preexisting approach to federal free exercise rights, courts should be guided by
the pre-Smith case law in making the determinations required by the proposed
approach to Establishment Clause limitations on religious exemptions.
VI. SUBSTANTIAL AND INSUBSTANTIAL BURDENS
After examining in Section A the benchmarks supplied by leading federal free
exercise precedents in the years prior to Smith, I turn in Section B to the weight to
be given to a religious claimant’s characterization of the magnitude of the burden. In
Section C, I conclude my discussion of deciding substantiality of the burden by using
as an illustration the burden on religious liberty experienced by the baker in the
Masterpiece Cakeshop case.

A. How Substantial Is “Substantial”? Lessons from the Era
of Free Exercise Balancing
Taken together, four Supreme Court free exercise cases decided in the thirty years
before Smith—Braunfeld v. Brown in 1961,92 Sherbert v. Verner in 1963,93
Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972,94 and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of
88

Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 295 (1946).
89
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
90
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
91
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), is illustrative. As the Court explained
in relying on United States v. National Exchange Bank, 214 U.S. 302 (1909), for guidance in crafting a
federal common law rule for the commercial issue at hand:
The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed
by federal rather than local law. . . . In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards. . . . The
issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that
paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states. . . . The desirability of
a uniform rule is plain. And while the federal law merchant developed for about a century under
the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, represented general commercial law rather than a choice
of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source
of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions. United States v.
National Exchange Bank, 214 U.S. 302, falls in that category. . . .

Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67. For more on the nature of the federal common law that Erie left
the federal courts free to develop, see WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 87, § 60.
92

366 U.S. 599 (1961).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
94
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
93
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Labor in 198595—provide a good sense of the point at which the pre-Smith Court,
applying its free exercise balancing test, would find that a burden on free exercise is
sufficiently weighty to qualify as “substantial.” To avoid creating a misimpression, I
should note that although the free exercise claimants in two of the four cases selected
for illustration managed to persuade the Supreme Court to grant the requested
exemptions, free exercise claimants’ success rate in the high court between 1960 and
1990 was well below fifty percent.96
By a 6-3 vote, the Court in Braunfeld rejected a free exercise challenge by
Orthodox Jewish merchants to a Pennsylvania criminal statute prohibiting the sale
on Sunday of various commodities, including some types that they sold. Unless they
were willing to break with their religious tenets and work on Saturday, the Jewish
Sabbath, the statute had the practical effect of denying them a valuable
option—working six, rather than five, days a week—that merchants who observed a
Sunday Sabbath or no Sabbath at all were free to enjoy. The Orthodox Jewish
merchants maintained that an exemption was appropriate because closing on
Sundays would cause them to “suffer substantial economic loss,” put them in a
position of “serious economic disadvantage” relative to their competitors, and render
at least one of them “unable to continue in his business, thereby losing his capital
investment.”97
Writing for a plurality of four,98 Chief Justice Warren did not deny that the
Sunday closing law was apt to cause the Orthodox Jewish merchants some hardship,
but he downplayed its significance. He repeatedly called attention to the fact that the
law, though making it more difficult for them to observe the Jewish Sabbath, was
not prohibiting them from doing so. They were not, the Chief Justice explained,
“faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their religious practices or subjecting
themselves to criminal prosecution.”99 There were, he pointed out, “alternatives open
to appellants” that enabled them to be faithful to both their religion and the law—
continuing in their present business and closing both Saturday and Sunday, or
“engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for either Saturday
or Sunday labor.”100
95

471 U.S. 290 (1985).
There were fourteen losing and five winning free exercise claims during those years. See James E.
Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1407, 1458 (1992) (listing the thirteen losing and four winning free exercise claims after Sherbert,
which translate to fourteen losses and five wins when the results in Braunfeld and Sherbert are added in).
For reasons discussed infra note 131, the 5-14 won-lost record is actually deceptively high as an indicator
of the Court’s level of receptivity to free exercise claimants from 1960 to 1990.
97
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601–02 (quoting the plurality opinion’s summary of the merchants’
arguments).
98
The Chief Justice’s plurality opinion was joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Whittaker. The other
two votes for rejecting the merchants’ free exercise challenge came from Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.
99
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605; see also id. (acknowledging that some cases involve “the choice to the
individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution,” but maintaining
that “this is not the case before us because the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices
of appellants”).
100
Id. at 605–06.
96
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Conceding that the appellants’ taking advantage of either alternative “may well
result in some financial sacrifice,” the Chief Justice underlined that they were in a
position far preferable—“wholly different”—than “when the legislation attempts to
make a religious practice itself unlawful.”101 According to the Chief Justice, the
Sunday closing law “imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion.”102
He acknowledged that it would be “a gross oversimplification” to say that any law
burdening free exercise only indirectly is for that reason “unassailable.”103 He found,
however, that the state’s interest in “provid[ing] a weekly respite from all labor” and
“set[ting] one day of the week apart from the others as a day of rest, repose, recreation
and tranquility” was more than adequate to justify requiring the Orthodox Jewish
merchants to bear the indirect burden that the law placed on them.104
Unlike the free exercise claimants in Braunfeld, those in Sherbert and Yoder
satisfied the Court’s substantial burden requirement and ultimately prevailed on free
exercise grounds. Nothing decided or said by the Court in Sherbert or Yoder,
however, contradicts the message of Braunfeld that the operative bar for
substantiality is quite high.
In Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist was fired by her employer, a textile mill
operator, for refusing to work on Saturdays, her religion’s Sabbath. After she was
unable to find work at another mill that did not also require working Saturdays, she
applied for state unemployment compensation benefits. The state commission
charged with administering the benefits statute ruled that her religious reason for
refusing jobs requiring Saturday work did not constitute “good cause” for her refusals,
within the meaning of the statute, and that she was therefore ineligible for the
benefits.105

101
Id. at 606. In a lengthy separate opinion addressed not only to Braunfeld but also to its three
companion cases on Sunday closing laws, Justice Frankfurter described the burden on free exercise in
Braunfeld in somewhat stronger terms—“an undeniable financial burden”—than the Chief Justice had
used. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 521 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurring
in the judgment in Braunfeld and its companion cases) However, Justice Frankfurter also highlighted
some factors that in his view made the burden less than oppressive. The statute does not, he pointed out,
“make criminal” or “place under the onus of civil or criminal disability” any action that is “prescribed by
the duties” of Judaism. Id. Moreover, “the measure of the burden is not determined by fixed legislative
decree, beyond the power of the individual to alter. . . . [T]he legislature may have concluded that its
severity might be offset by the industry and commercial initiative of the individual merchant.” Id.
Particularly in light of (a) Justice Frankfurter’s use of only a reasonableness standard to decide the
constitutionality of the legislature’s not exempting Orthodox Jewish merchants from the statute’s
prohibition and (b) his conclusion that the standard was met (“the legislative choice of a blanket Sunday
ban applicable to observers of all faiths cannot be held unreasonable,” id. at 520), he, like the Chief Justice,
is best understood as treating the burden on free exercise as insubstantial.
102
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
103
Id. at 607.
104
Id. The Orthodox Jewish merchants’ free exercise challenge to the Sunday closing law was both to
the law on its face and to the law as applied to them. The Court rejected both prongs of the attack, id. at
609, refusing to strike down the law in its entirety or to carve out an exemption from the law in favor of
the free exercise claimants.
105
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963).
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Justice Brennan, one of the Braunfeld dissenters, wrote an opinion of the Court
in Sherbert for a 7-2 majority that included Chief Justice Warren, the author of the
Braunfeld plurality opinion, and Justice Black, the only other member of that
plurality still on the Court. Acknowledging that the state unemployment
compensation law, as authoritatively interpreted by the state high court, placed a
burden on the discharged employee that the Braunfeld plurality would have called
“indirect,” Justice Brennan quoted that plurality’s recognition that burdens may be
unconstitutional even if indirect.106 He then underlined the seriousness of the burden
in the case at hand:
The ruling [denying an award of unemployment benefits] forces her to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship.107

After “consider[ing] whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right”108 and concluding
that no such interest existed, Justice Brennan held in favor of her free exercise claim.
Yoder involved a Wisconsin statute requiring parents to ensure their children’s
attendance at a public or private school until the age of sixteen. Noncompliance was
punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. Several Amish parents who refused to
send their children to school after eighth grade were convicted of violating the statute
despite their claim that they were entitled to a court-ordered exemption under the
Free Exercise Clause.109
Writing for a Court that was unanimous except for one Justice’s partial dissent,110
Chief Justice Burger ruled that the Free Exercise Clause required exempting the
Amish parents from the criminal statute. Citing for authority only the Braunfeld
plurality’s discussion of the difference between the burden on free exercise in
Braunfeld and the burden on those facing criminal prosecution for adhering to their
religious beliefs,111 the Chief Justice found the burden on Amish free exercise to be
“not only severe, but inescapable.”112 According to the Chief Justice, schooling after
eighth grade implicates “attitudes, goals, and values” in such “sharp conflict” with the
“fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion” that requiring such
106

Id. at 403–04.
Id. at 404.
108
Id. at 406.
107

109

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972).
In his partial dissent, Justice Douglas insisted that the Court needed to reach the issue of whether
the defendants’ children shared the defendants’ religious objection to schooling after eighth grade. Id. at
241–46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
111
Id. at 218 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).
112
Id.
110
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schooling for Amish children poses “a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today.”113 It “would gravely endanger,”
he added, “if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs.”114
In short, although Sherbert and Yoder are proof that the operative conception of
substantial burden in the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise case law is not insuperable,
they do not alter the basic message sent by Braunfeld: a burden on free exercise must
be formidable to qualify as substantial. Most obviously, the Court’s opinions in
Sherbert and Yoder underline the weightiness of the burden at hand. In addition, far
from suggesting discontent with the way in which the substantial-burden
requirement was applied in Braunfeld, the Court in Sherbert and Yoder was careful
both to cite Braunfeld as illuminating the substantial-burden requirement and to
highlight the difference in magnitude between the burden in Braunfeld and the one
in the case at hand. Lastly, the willingness, noted above, of Chief Justice Warren,
the author of the Braunfeld plurality, and Justice Black, the only other member of
that plurality still on the Court at the time of Sherbert, to join the Court’s opinion
in Sherbert suggests that the two cases’ conception of substantial burden are not
materially, if at all, different.115
The Alamo Foundation case, the last of the four Supreme Court cases to be
discussed, was decided more than a decade after the three other cases and only several
years before Smith. The message that it sends about the Court’s operative conception
of substantiality fits comfortably with the ones sent by the three earlier cases.
Alamo Foundation involved the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s
minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements to individuals staffing a
nonprofit religious foundation’s commercial activities. The individuals engaged in
the commercial activities were mainly people who had fallen into alcohol or drug
abuse or criminal activity but then had been converted and rehabilitated by the
foundation. Although the foundation called them “associates,” rather than
“employees,” and did not compensate them with cash salaries for their role in the
foundation’s income-producing activities, the foundation did provide them with
food, shelter, and other in-kind benefits.116
In a unanimous opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court held, as a matter
of statutory interpretation, that the Act applied to the associates’ activities. The
Court then turned to the foundation’s argument that applying the Act to the
associates’ activities would violate their free exercise rights by forcing them, contrary
to their religious convictions, to receive wages.117 The Court noted that one of the
affected individuals had testified at trial that “no one ever expected any kind of
113
114

Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 219.

115
In light of the almost complete turnover in the Court’s membership between Braunfeld and Yoder,
it is very difficult to draw any inference about consistency between those two cases’ conception of
substantial burden based on the voting patterns of Justices who sat in both cases.
116
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 292-93 (1985).
117
The Court acknowledged that the foundation had standing to raise the associates’ free exercise
rights. Id. at 303 n.26.
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compensation, and the thought is totally vexing to my soul,” while another had
testified that “to even be considered to be forced to take a wage . . . offends my right
to worship God as I choose.”118 The Court emphasized, however, that the Free
Exercise Clause does not authorize courts to carve out an exemption unless a law
“actually burdens” religious exercise,119and the Court found no such burden. No one,
the Court pointed out, was being forced to take “cash wages” because the Act defines
“wage” to include in-kind benefits.120 Given that the associates were already receiving
in-kind benefits, it would appear, the Court continued, that “application of the Act
will work little or no change in their situation.”121 Finally, if the associates for some
reason felt burdened by being paid in in-kind benefits, “there is nothing in the Act
to prevent the associates from returning the amounts to the Foundation.”122
When the federal courts of appeals apply Supreme Court case law, they speak
with authority only second in importance to the Supreme Court’s as to the meaning
of that case law. A consensus on their part as to the meaning of particular cases
therefore deserves considerable weight. According to a detailed study of free exercise
cases decided by the federal courts of appeals in the ten years before Smith, the courts’
decisions in those cases reflected broad agreement among the courts that the
Supreme Court’s operative conception of substantial burdens was one that treated a
burden as substantial only if it was highly onerous.123 Of the various cases discussed
in the study, two, read in tandem, illustrate particularly well the conception of
substantial burden reflected in the federal appellate cases of that era. One is a Sixth
Circuit decision in 1983, Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Inc. v. City of Lakewood,124 and the other is an Eighth Circuit decision the following
year, Quaring v. Peterson.125
The Lakewood case involved a congregation’s free exercise challenge to a city
zoning ordinance limiting the construction of places of worship to areas not zoned
for residential use. After worshipping for a number of years in a storefront in one of
the city’s nonresidential areas, the congregation had purchased a lot in an area zoned
exclusively for residential use. It then applied unsuccessfully to the zoning board for

118

Id. at 303 n.27.
Id. at 303.
120
Id. at 303–04.
121
Id.at 304.
122
Id. The Court disposed in similar manner of the claim that the Act’s recordkeeping requirements
119

seriously burdened the associates’ religious exercise: “This claim rests on a misreading of the Act. Section
211 imposes recordkeeping requirements on the employer, not on the employees.” Id. at 303 n.27.
123
See Ryan, supra note 96, at 1417, 1421. Within several years, the student author of the Note had
begun an illustrious career at the University of Virginia, first as a member of the law faculty and, since
2018, as university president. McGregor McCance, Board of Visitors Selects James E. Ryan as University
of Virginia’s Next President, UVATODAY (Sept. 15, 2017), https://news.virginia.edu/content/boardvisitors-selects-james-e-ryan-university-virginias-next-president [https://perma.cc/3WST-35CB].
124
699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
125
728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472
U.S. 478 (1985). Because the eight Justices sitting on the case split 4-4 on whether to affirm or reverse,
there was no written opinion in the Supreme Court.
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a variance and followed up with a free exercise challenge in federal district court that
also failed.126
In affirming on appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the congregation had
failed to make the threshold showing of burden needed to trigger more than rational
basis review. In reaching that conclusion, the court focused on three Supreme Court
cases: Sherbert and Yoder as “primary examples of government actions which
infringe religious freedom,” and Braunfeld as “an informative contrast.”127 After
acknowledging that requiring the congregation to conform to the zoning ordinance
imposed “an indirect financial burden and a subjective aesthetic burden” on the
congregation,128 the court distinguished those burdens from the type found
substantial in Sherbert and Yoder129 and equated them with the type found
insubstantial in Braunfeld.130
According to the study of federal appellate free exercise decisions in the ten years
before Smith, the free exercise claimants prevailed in only twelve of the ninety-seven
cases decided.131 Quaring was in that select group of twelve. Frances Quaring sued
in federal court for an exemption from a Nebraska statute limiting the issuance of
driver’s licenses to applicants who allow the DMV to take their photo and put it on
the wallet-size license card that drivers must have on hand when driving. Describing
herself as a Christian who does not adhere to the beliefs of any particular
denomination, Quaring maintained that she would be violating the Second
Commandment’s prohibition on graven images132 if she allowed her photo to be
taken for this or any other purpose or if she had in her possession any photo or

126

Lakewood, 699 F.2d. at 303–05.
Id. at 305-06.
128
Id. at 307.
129
See id. (“[T]his is not a case where the Congregation must choose between exercising its religious
127

beliefs and forfeiting government benefits or incurring criminal penalties.”).
130
As the court explained:
The Supreme Court’s statement in Braunfeld accurately summarizes our conclusion about the
nature of the Congregation’s interest and the nature of the City’s burden on that interest. The
Lakewood ordinance ‘simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to the appellants,
operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.’ [Braunfeld,] 366
U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). . . .

Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307.
131
Ryan, supra note 96, at 1417. Statistically, the record of free exercise claimants in the Supreme
Court during those years seems quite a bit better: three victories out of a total of ten cases. See id. at 1458
(listing cases won and lost). However, those statistics are misleading for a variety of reasons. Most
obviously, because the Supreme Court is highly selective in exercising its discretionary review authority
and essentially decides only cases it is interested in deciding, the sample size is not only very small but also
unrepresentative of the cases in the pipeline. In addition, the three free exercise victories in the Court all
came in a very narrow range of cases—unemployment compensation cases—that could have been decided
differently only if the Court was prepared to overrule a major precedent, Sherbert.
132
The Second Commandment states, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or likeness
of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.”
Exodus 20:4; Deuteronomy 5:8.
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depiction of people, animals, plant life, etc.133 After the district court ruled in her
favor, the Eighth Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 vote.
Before addressing the magnitude of the burden on Quaring’s free exercise, the
majority opinion underlined that although her beliefs were “unusual in the twentieth
century,” they qualified as religious under the courts’ “expansive definition of
religion” under the First Amendment.134 They had “some support from historical
and biblical tradition,”135and it was “clear” that Quaring sincerely held them.136
Turning to the nature of the burden, the court described it as “unmistakable.”137
The photograph requirement, the court explained, made Quaring choose between
“following an important precept of her religion or forgoing the important privilege
of driving a car.”138 According to the court, the burden placed on Quaring by making
her choose between driving privileges and her religious beliefs was
“indistinguishable” from the burden that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
in Sherbert, where forfeiting unemployment compensation benefits was the cost of
staying true to one’s religion.139
By 1984, the year Quaring was decided, so many people were already so
dependent on driving to meet their and their family’s everyday needs that one might
have expected the court simply to offer generalizations to justify characterizing
driving as an “important” privilege. Notably, however, the majority instead
underlined the special importance of driving to Quaring. “Quaring needs to drive a
car,” the court pointed out, “for numerous daily activities, which
include managing a herd of dairy and beef cattle, helping her husband manage a
thousand-acre farming and livestock operation, and working as a bookkeeper in a
community ten miles from home.”140
Writing in dissent, Judge Fagg maintained that the burden was no more than
“incidental.”141 True, he conceded, “Quaring may experience daily inconvenience
because she cannot drive a motor vehicle,” but “[h]er difficulties . . . are not
insurmountable and she is not the only person that has been faced with the need to
make life-style adjustments precipitated by nonconformity with driver’s license

133
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d by an equally divided court
sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)
134
Id. at 1123.
135
Id. at 1124. Drawing on several sources, including the testimony at trial of a religious studies
professor and material in the Encyclopedia Judaica and elsewhere, the court described in considerable

detail the support for Quaring’s beliefs in some Jewish interpretations of the Second Commandment,
especially interpretations from long ago but to some extent “modern-day” ones as well. Id. at 1124 & n.3.
136
Id. at 1125.
137

Id.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1129 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
138
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requirements.”142 For Judge Fagg, the Supreme Court precedent most obviously in
point was Braunfeld, not Sherbert.143
Perhaps the reason that the majority focused sharply on Quaring’s special
situation and insisted on equating the burden with the one found impermissible in
Sherbert was simply that it wanted to counter as forcefully as possible the dissent’s
much less sympathetic characterization of the burden. Perhaps, however, at least in
part, the reason was that the court recognized both that the Supreme Court’s free
exercise case law set the bar for substantiality quite high and that the burden at hand
was not one that easily cleared the bar.
As I suggested at the start of this section, in incorporating into my proposed
approach the relatively rigorous standard of substantiality applied in free exercise
cases prior to Smith, I rely in part simply on respect for the accumulated wisdom of
precedent. In addition, however, I rely on my own conviction that the standard
reflected in precedent struck an appropriate balance between (a) a
value—religious liberty—of the highest constitutional order and (b) the latitude
needed by legislatures to govern effectively in what Chief Justice Warren in
Braunfeld called “a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference.”144 On the one hand, if, in such a religiously diverse
society, a slightly more than minimal burden on some persons’ religious liberty were
enough to trigger application of the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test, the
potential for exemptions to undermine the efficacy of much lawmaking would be
profound. On the other hand, in a nation in which legislators depend for their
election and reelection on appealing to the will of the majority, legislators are often
unaware of, or insensitive to, the impact that their laws will have on religious
minorities. Under the circumstances, if the threshold of substantiality is so high that
it is surpassed only in the most egregious cases, religious liberty, especially for
religious minorities, would be seriously shortchanged. In my view, the standard of
substantiality reflected in the pre-Smith case law represents a sound middle ground.

B. “Substantial” from Whose Perspective?
In determining in the years before Smith whether a burden on free exercise was
sufficient in magnitude to require strong government justification, the Supreme
Court took into account, but did not treat as determinative, the free exercise
claimant’s characterization of the burden. The Court’s analysis of burden in
Braunfeld and Alamo Foundation, summarized above, is illustrative. In both cases,
the Court properly proceeded on the assumption that the magnitude of the burden
is ultimately a matter for judicial determination. For a court to determine magnitude
of the burden simply by deferring to the religious claimant’s characterization of
142

Id. at 1128.
In summarizing his reasons for rejecting Quaring’s claim, Judge Fagg quoted for authority a couple
of sentences from the plurality opinion in Braunfeld, id. at 1128–29, but he made no mention of Sherbert
anywhere in his opinion.
144
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (plurality opinion).
143
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magnitude essentially, and wrongly, delegates to the claimant the authority to resolve
a legal issue within the court’s responsibility and competence to resolve.145
Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, courts do, and should, defer to
a free exercise claimant’s representation that the belief allegedly burdened by
government action qualifies as “religious” for purposes of the First Amendment. The
Eighth Circuit’s readiness, discussed above, to treat Quaring’s “unusual” beliefs as
“religious” exemplifies such deference. For courts to proceed otherwise and come to
an independent determination whether the belief constitutes a sound or preferred
understanding of the religion that the claimant purports to follow would enmesh
courts in the resolution of questions of religious doctrine in a way that strikes at the
heart of the Establishment Clause and its implicit prohibition on “active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity.”146 Such exercises of judicial autonomy would
also be antithetical to core values of the Free Exercise Clause—in particular, its
respect for individual freedom to adopt a non-orthodox understanding of the
precepts of one’s religion.147

145
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They Must)
Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94 (2017); Anna Su, Varieties of
Burden in Religious Accommodations, 33 J.L. & RELIG. (forthcoming 2018), available at

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3060692 [https://perma.cc/Y6QN-T8C9].
146
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
147
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), is probably the Court’s most important statement
of principles on the matter. Eddie Thomas quit his job at an Indiana factory when he was transferred from
a department that made sheet steel for industrial uses to a department that made turrets for military tanks.
He gave as his reason for quitting that, as a Jehovah’s Witness, he believed that he should not be engaged
in any work that is part of the process of producing arms for warfare. Id. at 709-10.
When Thomas applied for unemployment compensation under the Indiana Employment Security
Act and reiterated that reason for quitting the job, the state board charged with administering the Act
rejected his application on the ground that his reason for quitting did not come within Act’s “good cause”
requirement. He successfully appealed to a state intermediate appellate court, which ruled in his favor on
federal free exercise grounds. However, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that his claim was
not “religious” within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
In reversing on that ground, the state high court relied in part on what it perceived as logical
inconsistencies in Thomas’s beliefs. In particular, Thomas had testified at trial that he would be
comfortable doing certain work that, in the high court’s view, was logically indistinguishable from the
type of work that he actually declined to do. Id. at 715. The state court also relied on what it saw as
Thomas’s misunderstanding of the tenets of his religion. It pointed out that another Jehovah’s Witness
had testified at trial that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not barred by their faith from doing the type of work
Thomas maintained he could not do. Id.
By an 8-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
maintained that “[t]he determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice . . . is not to turn upon a
judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” Id. at
714. “Thomas drew a line,” the Chief Justice went on, “and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was
an unreasonable one.” Id. Moreover, “the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are
shared by all of the members of a religious sect.” Id. at 715-16. Although the Chief Justice cautioned that
judicial deference to a free exercise claimant’s characterization of a belief or practice as “religious” should
not be wholly unlimited, he simultaneously affirmed how very broad that deference should be: “One can,
of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled
to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. at 715.
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It is a very different matter, however, for courts to come to an independent
determination whether the burden that the state has placed on adherence to a
particular belief is as significant as the free exercise claimant maintains. Although
courts cannot second-guess the religious claimant as to what actions his or her
religion forbids or requires, the magnitude of the burden almost never turns simply
on that question. The rare instances in which it does are when the claimant faces the
stark choice of (a) do as the law dictates and suffer the personal turmoil and other
adverse consequences of violating one’s religion or (b) do as one’s religion dictates
and suffer incarceration and other adverse consequences of violating the law. Far
more frequently, the claimant faces a choice that is not so stark, and the questions
that need to be resolved to determine the magnitude of the burden include various
ones of a nonreligious nature.
Consider, for example, the choice faced by the Orthodox Jewish merchants in
Braunfeld148 and the various nonreligious questions relevant to determining the
magnitude of the burden on their religion. It was not a stark choice between
following the law or following their religion. It was hardly inconceivable for them to
follow both. At least in theory, there were a number of ways for them to do so. Most
obviously, they could comply with the demands of their religion by not working on
Saturday, comply with the demands of the state’s Sunday closing laws by not working
on Sunday, and make do with what they were able to earn Monday through Friday
by cutting back on their costs of doing business or by reducing their personal lifestyle
expenses, or both. Alternatively, they could rest on both days and try to make up the
lost income from only working five days a week by extending their hours on weekdays
or by adopting changes to their ways of doing business that would enable them to
earn more per hour than they had been earning. Or they could diversify their
businesses to include a component in which they could be engaged on Sundays
without running afoul of the closing laws. Or they could change careers to a
profession like law that the state would allow them to practice day and night on
Sundays if they wished.
To decide the magnitude of the burden on the merchants, compiling a list of
conceivable courses of action is a good start, but it is no more than that. The next,
and much more difficult, step is to evaluate for each alternative its practical
availability and its likelihood of achieving the desired effect. Such an evaluation
entails answering a host of questions of a nonreligious nature.
The burden analysis is somewhat different with a burden stemming from a law
conditioning eligibility for a government benefit on behavior antithetical to some
people’s religion, but the magnitude of the burden is similarly dependent on the
answers to a variety of questions of a nonreligious nature. Consider, for example, the
burden in Quaring stemming from Nebraska’s driver’s license photo requirement.149
Whether or not the photo requirement substantially burdened Quaring’s religion
depended on how much pressure an inability to drive would exert on her decision
148
149

See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–43.
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whether to abide by her religion, and the answer to that question of degree would
turn on the answers to a variety of questions of a practical and nonreligious nature.
To what extent, for example, would having the ability to drive contribute to her
success in her business activities and to her having a sense of fulfillment in her
personal activities? If she were unable to drive, what alternative means of
transportation would exist for her? How easily accessible and affordable would they
be? Were there ways that she could revise or restructure her business and personal
activities to enable her to accommodate more easily being unable to drive? How
significant would the costs be to her business success and personal fulfillment from
any such revising or restructuring?
However easy or difficult it would be to answer these and other relevant
questions, the questions do not call on the court to second-guess Quaring’s
representation as to what conscientious observance of her religion entails. The
answers that Quaring might offer to such non-religious questions certainly deserve
the court’s careful consideration, but no more. It is the court’s responsibility to answer
them as best it can and ultimately to step back and view the answers collectively to
arrive at a considered judgment as to the substantiality or insubstantiality of the
burden at hand.

C. An Illustration: The Burden in Masterpiece Cakeshop
Under the proposed approach to whether or not a burden on religious liberty is
substantial, there cannot help but be borderline cases – perhaps significantly fewer
than if the applicable standard of substantiality were considerably lower, but
undoubtedly some. From my perspective, the burden on the merchants in Braunfeld,
which the Court by a 6-3 margin treated as insubstantial, qualified as one. I believe
the burden on the bakery owner in Masterpiece Cakeshop almost certainly was no
greater and probably was less. For purposes of illustration, the burden in Masterpiece
Cakeshop is worth exploring in some depth.
Let me begin with an argument for discounting that burden that may have some
appeal but ultimately should be rejected: that Phillips, the bakery owner, was simply
off base in thinking that there was any connection between his filling Craig and
Mullins’s wedding-cake order and his being faithful to his religion as a Christian. In
Phillips’s mind, filling the order would violate his religion because it would send a
message affirming same-sex marriage that would displease God.150 But, someone
may ask, was Phillips reading more significance into his filling that order than he
150

As Phillips explained in his petition for Supreme Court review:
Phillips . . . will not create cakes celebrating any marriage that is contrary to his understanding
of biblical teaching. As a Christian, Phillips believes that God ordained marriage as the sacred
union between one man and one woman, a union that exemplifies the relationship of Christ
and His Church. And Phillips’ religious conviction compels him to create cakes celebrating
only marriages that are consistent with his understanding of God’s design….

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 6 (internal cross-references omitted).
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should have? Would people really interpret his filling a gay couple’s order for a
custom wedding cake as an affirmation by him that same-sex marriage is a good
thing? Even more importantly – because displeasing God seems to be at the core of
Phillips’s religious objection – was there really any danger that God would interpret
Phillips’s actions that way? After all, even if some people might not appreciate the
importance of the fact that Phillips is running his bakeshop in a state with a
nondiscrimination statute that limits his freedom to decide which couples’ orders to
fill, surely God appreciates it!
I do think a court should be asking itself questions of this sort if properly
adjudicating Phillips’s constitutional rights truly requires determining how
reasonable he was being in seeing a strong connection between his designing and
making wedding cakes and his obligations as a Christian. But a proper adjudication
of Phillips’s constitutional rights requires nothing of the sort. Indeed, any attempt
by the court to gauge the reasonableness of Phillips’s belief is wholly out of bounds.
As the Supreme Court has affirmed time and again, courts must take an individual’s
understanding of his or her religion as a given. The Court has acknowledged that
“[o]ne can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in
motivation as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”151 But
Phillips’s claim, even if based on an understanding of his job and his obligations as a
Christian that many might not share, hardly belonged in the “so bizarre” category
hypothesized by the Court for wildly idiosyncratic beliefs.
Phillips’s claim of a substantial burden on his religious liberty, however, was
unpersuasive nonetheless. In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Phillips maintained
that “[t]his Court’s review is needed to alleviate the stark choice Colorado offers to
those who, like Phillips, earn a living through artistic means: Either use your talents
to create expression that conflicts with your religious beliefs about marriage, or suffer
punishment under Colorado’s public accommodation law.”152 Writing shortly after
Masterpiece Cakeshop was argued in the Supreme Court, two well-known political
and social commentators, David Brooks and Andrew Sullivan, each described in
terms much like Phillips’s the choice that Colorado had offered him. “I worry,” wrote
Sullivan, “that a ruling that backs the right of the state to coerce someone into doing
something that violates their religious conscience will also have terrible
consequences.”153 Similarly, as Brooks put it, “Phillips is not trying to restrict gay
marriage or gay rights; he’s simply asking not to be forced to take part.”154 While
underlining their support for same-sex marriage, Brooks and Sullivan also made clear
that they felt great empathy for Phillips, and they faulted Craig and Mullins, the gay
couple, for resorting to litigation to force Phillips’s hand, rather than leaving him
alone and making the most of their wedding without one of his cakes.155
151

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. For more on Thomas, see supra note 147.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 2.
153
Sullivan, supra note 15.
154
Brooks, supra note 15.
155
See id. (“First, it’s just a cake. It’s not like they were being denied a home or a job, or a wedding. .
152

. . Second, Phillips’s opinion is not a strange opinion. . . . Third, the tide of opinion is quickly swinging
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But the choice that Colorado was offering to Phillips was not nearly as stark as
he, Brooks, and Sullivan described it. Just as Pennsylvania was not telling Braunfeld
and his fellow Orthodox Jewish merchants that they had to start working on the
Jewish Sabbath, Colorado was not telling Phillips that he had to start designing and
making wedding cakes for same-sex couples. Colorado was insisting on
nondiscrimination, which Phillips could have achieved in either of two ways: design
and make wedding cakes for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples; or stop
designing and making wedding cakes for sale to anyone. Although Phillips could not
help but violate his religious beliefs if he opted for the first course of action, he could
avoid violating those beliefs if he opted for the second.
Ultimately, for Phillips as for Braunfeld, the substantiality of the burden on
religious liberty was a more-or-less, not black-and-white, question that turned on
practicalities. How much of a choice did Phillips really have to abide by the demands
of the law and his religion? As much as, or even more than, Braunfeld? The answer
lies in the economic realities.
In Braunfeld, the six Justices who voted to deny the free exercise claim seemed
satisfied that the economic realities were not so grim as to make the option of resting
both Saturday and Sunday available to the merchants only in theory and not in fact.156
Nevertheless, the merchants’ capacity to mitigate the financial consequences of being
closed Saturday and Sunday surely was quite limited. The fears that they expressed
in court that their competitors, free to work six days a week, would be able to use
that advantage to drive down the Jewish merchants’ profits and perhaps even drive
them out of business were hardly frivolous.
For Phillips, the option of running the bakery while no longer designing and
making wedding cakes surely posed an economic challenge. I am inclined to doubt,
though, that it posed a challenge as great as the one the merchants in Braunfeld had
to face. In my view, his capacity to mitigate the financial consequences of giving up
the custom wedding-cake business exceeded their capacity to mitigate the financial
consequences of no longer selling their commodities on Sundays.
As Phillips noted in his petition seeking Supreme Court review, weddings were
hardly the only occasion for which he did custom cakes to “communicate” the
occasion’s “celebratory themes.” He also did them for birthdays, anniversaries,
graduations, holidays, and more.157 Devoting time and energy to building up that
side of his business was surely not his preference, but it offered a promising means
for him to recoup much, if not all, of his losses from getting out of the custom
wedding-cake business.

in favor of gay marriage. . . . Given that context, the neighborly approach would be to say: ‘Fine, we won’t
compel you to do something you believe violates your sacred principles.’”); Sullivan, supra note 15 (“Why
take up arms to coerce someone when you can easily let him be – and still celebrate your wedding? . . .
And it seems deeply insensitive and intolerant to force the clear losers in a culture war into not just defeat
but personal humiliation.”).
156
See supra note 101 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s opinion, joined by Justice Harlan, concurring
in the judgment) and text accompanying notes 98–104 (discussing the plurality opinion).
157
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 1–2.
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When Phillips declined Craig and Mullins’s request to design and make a
wedding cake for them, he offered to sell them cookies and brownies,158 and in
describing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court strongly
implied that it sold a fairly wide range of baked goods.159 It seems, then, that ramping
up the non-custom-cake part of his business to help make up for income lost from
not doing custom wedding cakes was a promising option, too.
Of course, money is not everything. It is hard to imagine that the merchants in
Braunfeld suffered any loss other than economic when, to comply with the Sunday
closing law, they stopped selling their wares on Sundays. Phillips, however, might
well suffer an additional type of loss – one of self-expression – if, to comply with the
nondiscrimination law, he were to go out of the business of designing and making
wedding cakes. But that loss in self-expression is a loss that Phillips could
significantly mitigate as well. Most obviously, he is free to design and make wedding
cakes for him to give as wedding gifts to friends and family having opposite-sex
marriages. Of course, it would be very understandable if that option holds much less
appeal to Phillips than maintaining his custom wedding-cake business, but that is
very different from saying that a substantial loss in self-expression is an inevitable
cost of his heeding the demands of both his religion and Colorado’s
Anti-Discrimination Act.
VII. APPLYING THE NECESSARY-TO-A-COMPELLING-INTEREST TEST
Under my proposed approach, an exemption that lifts a substantial burden on
religious liberty survives Establishment Clause scrutiny unless denying
the exemption is necessary to serve a compelling state interest that the law’s
generally applicable terms are designed to serve. As discussed in Part V, I
believe the Supreme Court’s and lower courts’ application of the necessary-to-acompelling-interest test in the years of free exercise balancing prior to Smith
furnishes valuable benchmarks for applying the test in this context. After examining
leading precedents from that era in Section A, I look closely in Section B at the
problem of “ripple effects” that is so central to the requisite means-end analysis. In
Sections C and D, I again draw on Masterpiece Cakeshop to illustrate the application
of my proposed approach.

A. More Lessons from the Era of Free Exercise Balancing
I proceed here much as I did in Part VI. I begin by discussing the application of
the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test in four Supreme Court cases—two in
which the Court found that the demands of the test were met, and two in which the
Court found that they were not. I then turn to two federal appellate decisions – one
158

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).

159

See id. (“The shop offers a variety of baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies to
elaborate custom-designed cakes. . . .”); see also id. at 1726 (alluding to the bakery’s sale of cupcakes).
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finding the test’s demands were met, and one finding they were not. I again caution,
as I did in Part VI, not to infer from the free exercise claimants’ fifty percent success
rate in the cases selected for discussion that free exercise claimants generally prevailed
at that rate in the pre-Smith era. Their success rate was far less.160
In Sherbert v. Verner in 1963161 and Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972162—two cases
already discussed for their findings of a substantial burden163—the Court rejected
arguments that denying the free exercise claimant an exemption was necessary to
serve a compelling state interest. In rejecting those arguments, however, the Court
in both cases offered reasons that indicated that, in the free exercise area, the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test did not have the “strict in theory but fatal in
fact”164 clout that a leading scholar described it as having in the equal protection
realm.
In Sherbert, the South Carolina Employment Security Commission interpreted
the state unemployment compensation statute as disqualifying Sherbert from
receiving benefits because she had failed to accept available work after her discharge.
Under that interpretation, Sherbert’s failure to take other employment after her
discharge did not fall within the statute’s “good cause” exception even though the
only other work she could find was work she felt compelled to decline for the same
reason as led to her discharge: she would have had to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath
day as a Seventh-day Adventist. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
commission had interpreted the statute correctly and that the Free Exercise Clause
did not require the state to recognize Sherbert’s reason as a basis for a constitutional
exemption.165
In reversing the state high court’s denial of a free exercise exemption, the U.S.
Supreme Court firmly rejected the notion that denying Sherbert the exemption was
necessary to serve a compelling state interest. As the Court explained:
The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of
fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections
to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation
fund, but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday
work. But . . . no such objection appears to have been made before the
South Carolina Supreme Court, and we are unwilling to assess the
importance of an asserted state interest without the views of the state
court. Nor . . . [is there any] proof whatever to warrant such fears of
malingering or deceit . . . [and even if there were,] it would plainly be
incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of

160

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

161

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
163
See supra text accompanying notes 105–15.
164
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
165
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–401.
162
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regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights. . . . 166

In short, the appellees failed the applicable test on two counts. They needed to show
both a compelling interest (in denying the exemption) and a necessary
means-end relationship (between denying the exemption and effectively serving a
compelling interest), and they had shown neither.
Two aspects of the Court’s opinion are especially worth noting. First, although
the Court made clear that no compelling state interest had been proven, it seemed
to suggest that it would have been open to persuasion if the state high court had
characterized the interest in minimizing the filing of fraudulent claims as compelling
and supported that characterization with meaningful findings. By any measure,
minimizing the filing of fraudulent claims is hardly a trivial state interest. But it is
also not plainly an interest of the highest order. For that reason, the Court’s apparent
concession that it may qualify as compelling if given a firm affirmation of importance
by the state is some indication that the Court in free exercise cases prior to Smith
was willing to apply the concept of “compelling” with some flexibility and with some
deference to the state.
Second, although the Court in the above excerpt brushed aside the appellees’
arguments in a way that may seem almost cavalier, there are also some significant
indications in the Court’s opinion, principally in footnotes, that the Court in fact
was approaching the implications of creating an exemption with considerable care.
In one footnote, for example, the Court pointed out that “[t]he record indicates that
of the 150 or more Seventh-day Adventists in the Spartanburg area [where Sherbert
lived and worked], only appellant and one other have been unable to find suitable
non-Saturday employment.”167 The implication seems to be that, having consulted
the record for concrete data, the Court was now satisfied that granting an exemption
to Sherbert was not going to open the floodgates to a barrage of claims by Seventhday Adventists that might pose a genuine threat to the solvency of the unemployment
compensation program. To similar effect, the Court in another footnote observed
that, prior to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in the case at hand, “state
supreme courts had, without exception, granted benefits to persons who were
physically available for work but unable to find suitable employment solely because
of a religious prohibition against Saturday work.”168 In other words, having examined
various state high courts’ responses to requests like Sherbert’s, the Court was
persuaded that there was no good reason to fear the adverse consequences that the
appellees maintained an exemption for Sherbert would bring.
In Yoder, as in Sherbert, the Court found not only a substantial burden on
individual religious exercise but also an inadequate state justification for denying an
exemption to lift that burden. Unlike the Court in Sherbert, however, the
Court in Yoder treated the adequacy of the state’s justification as a close
166

Id. at 407.
Id. at 399 n.2.
168
Id. at 407 n.7.
167
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question warranting detailed explanation. In providing that explanation, the
Court in Yoder offered considerable insight into its operative conception of the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test.
To assess the adequacy of the justification offered by Wisconsin for refusing to
exempt the Amish from its requirement that all children attend school to age sixteen,
the Court began by identifying two interests as central to that justification:
“prepar[ing] citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system,” and “prepar[ing] individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants
in society.”169 The state characterized both interests as compelling, and the Court did
not question that characterization. The Court did question, however, the state’s
insistence that, to serve those interests fully, it was necessary that the state be allowed
to require Amish children to attend school to age sixteen, rather than only through
eighth grade, as the Amish defendants were willing to let their children do.
According to the Court, “the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is
persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of formal high school
for Amish children . . . would do little to serve those interests.”170
In support of that conclusion, the Court highlighted several distinctive features
of the Amish community, including the “self-sufficiency” the community has long
managed to achieve171 and the strong “vocational education” it has provided for
Amish children in adolescence.172 The Court credited the eight years of standard
education that Amish children receive as going a long way toward serving both state
interests.173 It also underlined the special value for Amish children of having their
education after those eight years be one tailored to their likely future of working on
“the family farm” as part of “a separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient
community.”174
Perhaps most notable are the Court’s comments on the state’s justification in the
final part of the opinion – the part devoted to summarizing the Court’s holding and
reasoning in the case. The Court made clear that it did not arrive lightly at the
conclusion that Wisconsin’s denying the Amish the requested exemption was not
necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Rather, the Amish had succeeded in
showing that their situation was very distinctive in a way that directly undercut the
force of the state’s justification for refusing to treat the Amish differently than anyone
else for purposes of the compulsory education requirement. According to the Court,
in showing the value of the Amish vocational education “in terms of precisely those
overall interests” urged by the state in support of compulsory schooling to age sixteen,
the Amish defendants had made a “convincing showing, one that probably few other
169

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
Id. at 222.
171
Id. at 222–23.
172
Id. at 224–25.
173
See id. at 226-27; see also id. at 241 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Stewart, JJ., concurring)
(“[T]he State’s valid interest in education has already been largely satisfied by the eight years the children
have already spent in school.”).
174
Id. at 224–25, 229 (majority opinion).
170
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religious groups or sects could make.”175 The Yoder Court’s message to lower courts
for adjudicating free exercise exemptions claims seems clear: Do not find that the
state has failed to show the necessity of denying the requested exemption unless you
are satisfied that granting the exemption to the claimant(s) before the court does not
pave the way for a host of exemptions for others that, taken together, would
substantially undermine a compelling state interest that the law is designed to serve.
United States v. Lee176 and Bob Jones University v. United States,177 two
Supreme Court decisions in the early 1980s in which the Court found that free
exercise exemptions were unwarranted despite substantial burdens on religious
liberty, exemplify the Court’s somewhat deferential application of the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test in the free exercise area. According to some
commentators, the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise decisions finding the test’s
requirements met are so hard to explain in terms of the usual understanding of those
requirements that the Court must have been tacitly applying a diluted version of the
test.178 As I will discuss, I do not share that view. For now, though, I underline that
I do agree that the Court was applying the test in this realm with greater flexibility
than it applied the test in deciding, for example, equal protection challenges to
suspect classifications and free speech challenges to laws designed to silence the
expression of certain points of view.
The Court’s concern, expressed in Yoder, with the possible ripple effects of
granting an exemption strongly resurfaced a decade later in Lee, another case
involving the Amish. This time it prompted the Court to rule against the free
exercise claim. Edwin Lee had several people working for him on his farm and in his
carpentry shop. Lee was Amish as were all his employees. Lee sought an exemption
under the Free Exercise Clause from the federal statutes requiring employers to file
social security tax returns, withhold the employees’ share of social security taxes, and
pay the employer’s share of such taxes. He maintained that his religion left him no
choice but to refuse to pay the taxes. Pointing to the Biblical admonition, “But if any
provide not . . . for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse
than an infidel,”179 Lee explained that the Amish religion regards it as sinful for an
employer to contribute to the national social security system rather than provide
directly and adequately for his or her employees’ well-being.180
The Supreme Court unanimously denied the free exercise claim. With Chief
Justice Burger again writing for the Court, the Court quickly rejected the
government’s attempt to cast doubt on the substantiality of the free exercise burden
and turned to the adequacy of the government’s justification for requiring Lee to bear
that burden. Applying the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test, the Court first
175

Id. at 235–36.

176

455 U.S. 252 (1982).
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
178
See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 93–96 (1995); McConnell, supra note 29, at 1127–28.
179
1 Timothy 5:8.
180
Lee, 455 U.S. at 254–55 & n.3.
177

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3294146

2017–2018

Permissible Accommodation or Impermissible Endorsement?

583

examined the importance of the government interest implicated by Lee’s exemption
claim. Describing the social security system as “by far the largest domestic
governmental program in the United States today,” and characterizing “mandatory
participation” by covered employers and employees as “indispensable to the fiscal
vitality of the social security system,” 181 the Court found that the government interest
at stake met the compelling-interest requirement of the test.
The Court then turned to the test’s requirement of a necessary means-end
relationship and concluded that it was met as well. Unmistakably central to the
Court’s conclusion was an overriding concern with possible ripple effects of granting
the requested exemption—a concern that, the Court noted, made the case at hand
“[u]nlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder.”182 Very simply, in the
Court’s view, this case was not about the threat posed to the fiscal vitality of the social
security system by exempting Lee alone, or even all Amish employers, from the
system. Rather, it was about the threat posed to the system by courts’ inability to
draw a logically defensible line between Lee’s claim and “myriad” others “flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs.”183 In fact, from the Court’s perspective, the
threat posed was even greater than that. Because “[t]here is no principled way, . . .
for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed
under the Social Security Act,”184 a ruling in favor of Lee would invite a flood of
claims for exemptions that would threaten the integrity of the entire system of
taxation. “If, for example,” the Court explained, “a religious adherent believes war is
a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to
war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be
exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax.”185
Like Lee, Bob Jones University was a tax case in which the Court concluded that
denying a free exercise exemption was necessary to serve a compelling government
interest. However, the Court’s reasoning in Bob Jones University in support of that
conclusion was quite different than its reasoning in Lee. In particular, the Court
made clear that, for the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test to be met, there need
not always be a substantial likelihood of wide-ranging ripple effects. In some
instances, granting the requested exemption simply to the free exercise claimant(s)
before the court is enough to undermine substantially the compelling interest at
stake.
Bob Jones University and another private nonprofit school, both run in
accordance with their leaders’ fundamentalist Christian beliefs, sought a free exercise
exemption from an Internal Revenue Service revenue ruling that conditioned
educational institutions’ tax-exempt status on their not discriminating against
181

Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
183
Id. at 260.
184
Id.
185
Id. In the final part of its opinion, the Court addressed, and distinguished, the exemption from
182

the social security system that Congress had legislated for the self-employed who are religiously opposed
to participating in the system. Id. at 260–61.
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students on the basis of race. Both schools had racially discriminatory admissions
policies that they claimed should not cost the schools’ their tax-exempt status because
the policies were adopted based on the school administrations’ understanding of
certain passages in the Bible.186
With Chief Justice Burger writing and only one Justice in dissent,187 the
Supreme Court rejected the schools’ free exercise claim. The Court acknowledged
that denying the schools tax-exempt status “will inevitably have a substantial impact”
on their operation.188 The government interest in not granting the schools that status,
the Court maintained, was “compelling”—“a fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education.”189 Furthermore, that interest
“substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’
exercise of their religious beliefs.”190 In essence, even if no schools other than the two
before the Court were relieved, for religious reasons, of the obligation to pursue
racially nondiscriminatory admissions policies, that would be two schools too many.
The harm to the compelling government interest would be done. There are, the
Court insisted, “no less restrictive means” of achieving that interest than rejecting the
two schools’ free exercise claim.191
The study mentioned earlier of federal appellate free exercise decisions
in the ten years before Smith found a pattern in the courts’ application of the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test that suggests a widely shared understanding
among them that the Supreme Court case law called for a more flexible application
of the test in the free exercise area than elsewhere.192 Taken together, two cases
included in that study – EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n,193 decided by the
Ninth Circuit in 1982, and Quaring v. Peterson,194 decided by the Eighth Circuit in
1984 and already discussed here for its finding of a substantial burden – provide a

186
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 578-80, 583 & n.6 (1983). At the time the case
was decided, the two schools’ efforts to justify racial discrimination in terms of religious mandates may
have struck many people as aberrational. Sadly, however, there was plenty of historical precedent. As
Professor Eskridge observed in providing a detailed account of such efforts, “For most of American
history, the law uncontroversially denied racial minorities equal treatment wherever religious majorities
believed as a matter of faith that racial variation from ‘whiteness’ was malignant.” William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist
Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 665 (2011).
187
Six Justices joined the Chief Justice’s opinion in full, Justice Powell joined the opinion in part and
concurred in the judgment, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
188
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603–04. Although the Court never expressly characterized the burden
on free exercise as substantial, it appeared to be treating it as such.
189
Id. at 604.
190

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
See Ryan, supra note 96, at 1417–21. I perhaps should note that, although I find very helpful the
191

study’s documentation of this more flexible application, I take a more positive view of that phenomenon,
as I discuss infra text accompanying notes 216–25.
193
676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
194
728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472
U.S. 478 (1985).
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good sense of the way in which the test generally was applied by the federal courts of
appeals.
The litigation in Pacific Press arose out of employment discrimination charges
that Lorna Tobler, an employee of Pacific Press, filed with the EEOC. Pacific Press
was a nonprofit publishing house affiliated with the Seventh-day Adventist Church
and engaged in the business of publishing a monthly magazine, books, and other
materials related to the Church’s teachings. Tobler filed charges with the EEOC
alleging that Pacific Press’s wage scale discriminated against her as a married
woman.195 When Pacific Press learned of the charges, it retaliated against Tobler by
a series of moves that increasingly diminished her scope of responsibilities. The
EEOC filed suit against Pacific Press in federal district court for violating Tobler’s
federal rights under Title VII to be free from sex discrimination in employment and
from retaliation for filing charges with the EEOC. Several months later, Pacific
Press discharged her.196 The district court ruled that Pacific Press’s sex discrimination
and retaliation both violated Title VII, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of Pacific Press’s free exercise defense to the
sex discrimination charge. Requiring Pacific Press not to discriminate on the basis of
sex, the court maintained, could have “no significant impact upon the exercise of
Adventist beliefs because the Church proclaims that it does not believe in
discriminating against women.”197
The court acknowledged, however, that Pacific Press’s free exercise defense to
the retaliation charge presented a more complicated issue. Church doctrine
prohibited Church members from suing the Church. Pacific Press made membership
in the Church a condition of employment for all of its employees. Tobler, a Pacific
Press employee and member of the Church, had violated Church doctrine by suing
Pacific Press, a Church-affiliated corporation.198 Holding Pacific Press liable under
Title VII for disciplining Tobler in accordance with religious principles would have,
in the court’s words, “a substantial impact on the exercise of religious beliefs.”199
Under the circumstances, the relevant question thus became whether denying
Pacific Press an exemption from Title VII was necessary to a compelling interest,
and the court found that it was. At issue, the court stated, was “the government’s
compelling interest in assuring equal employment opportunities”200—an interest that
Title VII’s legislative history made clear is a “‘highest priority.’”201That interest, the
court maintained, “is equally if not more compelling than other interests that have
been held to justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious convictions.”202

195

Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1274–75.
Id. at 1275.
197
Id. at 1279.
198
Id. at 1274–75, 1280.
199
Id. at 1280.
200
Id.
201
Id. (quoting Senate committee report).
202
Id.
196
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To establish the necessary means-end relationship between not granting the
requested exemption and serving the compelling government interest in equal
employment opportunity, the court cited two key considerations. First, “protecting
the individual’s right to bring charges under Title VII” is vital to serving that interest
because “[u]nder Title VII, EEOC enforcement actions are triggered only when the
individual complainant files charges with the Commission.”203 Second, if Pacific
Press is held exempt from liability under Title VII for its religion-based retaliation,
the negative repercussions in terms of equal employment opportunities would be farreaching. A free exercise exemption authorizing Pacific Press to retaliate against
Tobler for behavior protected by Title VII logically would call for exemptions of the
same sort for “the hundreds of diverse organizations affiliated with the Adventist
Church, including businesses which process food, sell insurance, invest in stocks and
bonds, and run schools, hospitals, laboratories, rest homes and sanitariums.”204 Not
surprisingly, after expressing this concern about ripple effects, the court, as authority
for rejecting Pacific Press’s free exercise claim, pointed to the Supreme Court’s
analysis and resolution of the “similar free exercise issue” in Lee.205
As noted earlier,206 Quaring v. Peterson, the driver’s-license-photo case, is one of
the relatively few federal appellate cases in the decade before Smith in which the free
exercise claimant prevailed. The court’s perception that granting Quaring an
exemption was highly unlikely to open the floodgates to many similar claims goes a
long way toward explaining the court’s comfort in carving out the exemption.
According to the court, Quaring’s belief that her religion forbids her from being
photographed is sufficiently “unusual” that “[p]ersons seeking an exemption [like
hers] from the photograph requirement on religious grounds are likely to be few in
number.”207
To be sure, one reasonably may question whether the potential ripple effects of
granting Quaring an exemption were as limited as the court maintained. The court
offered its assessment of potential ripple effects in essentially conclusory fashion. It
made no real attempt to ascertain the prevalence of Quaring’s understanding of the
Second Commandment among Christians, not even acknowledging, for example,
that many Amish and Mennonites share it.208 Although the court in a footnote did
203

Id.
Id.
205
Id. at 1280-81. In keeping with Lee, the court in Pacific Press would have done well to discuss
204

more broadly the possible effects of granting Pacific Press an exemption. At a minimum, such effects
would extend beyond granting similar exemptions to Adventist Church-affiliated businesses to granting
ones to businesses affiliated with any religion with a prohibition on member suits. In addition, granting
the exemption to Pacific Press would help pave the way for religiously affiliated businesses seeking an
exemption from other Title VII obligations that conflict with religious doctrine.
206
See supra text accompanying note 131.
207
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1123, 1127 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d by an equally divided court
sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
208
See Mennonites Are at Odds with License-Photo Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at A22;
Lauryn Schroeder, House Bill Could Give Amish a Religious Exemption from Photos on State IDs,
HUFF. P OST, Jan. 31, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/31/31/amish-photoid_n_6581376.html. Of course, the number of Amish and Mennonites who would seek a religious
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acknowledge “some support” for Quaring’s belief in “modern-day interpretation of
Jewish law,” it focused primarily on the centuries-old origins of that “minority
position” in Jewish law and was entirely vague as to proportion of Jews who currently
share it.209 In addition, the court evinced no recognition whatsoever that some
members of non-Judeo-Christian faiths refuse for religious reasons to comply with
photograph requirements.210
Even assuming, however, that the court in Quaring significantly underestimated
the ripple effects of exempting Quaring from the DMV’s photo requirement,211 the
case is no less important for present purposes. The question at hand is the courts’
operative standard in applying the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test in free
exercise cases before Smith – the degree of flexibility with which the courts applied
that test, not how good a job the courts did in applying it. Whether the court in
Quaring was correct or mistaken about the likely ripple effects of granting Quaring
an exemption, the case illustrates equally well that in the era of free exercise balancing

exemption from the DMV photo requirement is limited by the fact that many in both groups are religiously
opposed to driving cars. See What’s the Difference Between Amish and Mennonites?, AMISH AM.,
http://amishamerica.com/whats-the-difference-between-amish-and-mennonites/
[https://perma.cc/B6HH-FMAZ] (last visited June 26, 2018). Despite the potential for, and actuality of,
horse and buggy accidents with pedestrians and cars, people are generally not required to get a license to drive
a horse and buggy, as many Amish and Mennonites do from a young age. See Melissa Siegler, Residents
Push Back Against Proposed Amish-Buggy Rules, WIS. STATE FARMER, Dec. 19, 2017,
https://www.wisfarmer.com/story/news/state/2017/12/19/residents-push-back-against-proposed-amishbuggy-rules/9662640011/.
209
Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1124 n.3. Seemingly implicit in the court’s discussion is that the only Jews
currently taking a view on the Second Commandment similar to Quaring’s are Orthodox. However,
Orthodox Jews are a sufficiently numerous group that one would want to know much more about the
prevalence of this belief among Orthodox Jews before trying to draw any inferences about how many Jews
might seek an exemption if one were granted to Quaring.
210
For example, Muslim women who wear a hijab commonly object on religious grounds to any
requirement that they be photographed with their face not covered by the veil. As University of Georgia
Professor Alan Godlas has explained, “Not only would removing it be a violation in their mind of the
Quran, it’s a violation of an element that’s essential to who they are. It is the most important single
religious symbol to many Muslim women.” Matt Bean, Freedom of Religion Meets the DMV, CNN.
COM, May 23, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/23/ctv/freeman. Citing traditional Native
American religious teachings, some Native Americans have refused to have their photographs
taken in the belief that the photo would “steal their soul.” Matt Crowley,
Soul Theft Through Photography , S KEPTICAL B RIEFS , vol. 24:1, Spring 2014,
https://www.csicop.org/sb/show/soul_theft_through-photography.
211
In fairness to the court, I should note that in saying that, “Persons seeking an exemption from the
photograph requirement on religious grounds are likely to be few in number,” the court may not have
meant that it had arrived at a firm conviction that few people were apt to seek an exemption like the one
sought by Quaring. Rather, the court may only have meant that, based on the evidence provided by the
state, it did not anticipate more than a few claims like Quaring’s. At the start of its discussion of whether
denying Quaring an exemption could be justified as necessary to serve a compelling state interest, the
court made clear its understanding that the burden was on the state to establish such a justification. See
Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1126 (“To prevail, the Nebraska officials must demonstrate that their refusal to
exempt Quaring from the photograph requirement serves a compelling state interest.”). In addition, at the
end of that discussion, the court took care to add the qualifier, “[a]t least on this record,” to its conclusion
that the state had failed to establish the requisite justification. Id. at 1127.
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that Smith abruptly brought to a close, courts were willing to carve out exemptions
only when they were persuaded that the ripple effects would be quite limited.
The Quaring court’s attention to the grounds for exemption already recognized
by state law is important for much the same reasons. As the court noted,
“photographs of the licensee are not required on learner’s permits, school permits
issued to farmers’ children, farm machinery permits, special permits for those with
restricted or minimal driving ability, or temporary licenses for individuals outside the
state whose old licenses have expired.”212 In the court’s view, the state’s allowing those
various grounds for exemption was tantamount to an admission that none of the
interests that the state put forward to justify denying an exemption to Quaring could
be all that compelling.213 Writing in dissent, Judge Fagg maintained that the court
was drawing an erroneous inference from the existing exemptions. In his view, those
exemptions were readily distinguishable from the one sought by Quaring, and the
court was wrong to discount the importance of the asserted state interests based on
the existing exemptions.214 I am inclined to disagree,215 but even if I were persuaded
by Judge Fagg’s objection, I would see Quaring as no less valuable for present
purposes. Either way, it illustrates well that courts prior to Smith were loath to carve
out free exercise exemptions absent evidence that in their view cogently
demonstrated that the requested exemption would not undermine vital state
interests.
To justify incorporating into my proposed approach the relatively flexible way in
which courts applied the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test in free exercise
cases before Smith, I rely, as I did to justify incorporating those cases’ operative
212
213

Id. at 1126.
Id. (“Because the state already allows numerous exemptions to the photograph requirement, the

Nebraska officials’ argument that denying Quaring an exemption serves a compelling state interest is
without substantial merit.”).
214
Id. at 1128 (Fagg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority attaches significance to the fact that Nebraska
exempts certain categories of permittees and temporary licensees from the photograph requirement;
however, the limitations placed upon these provisional operators deny any meaningful comparison with
the state’s regular license holders.”).
215
In trying to assess the importance of the interests that the state articulated in Quaring, I not only
would find the existing exemptions more telling than Judge Fagg found them, but I also would be
influenced by the driver’s license photo requirements in other states. The court in Quaring pointed out
that, at the time, a “few states” did not require anyone to have a driver’s licenses photo and added that,
“Notably . . . one of the Nation’s most populous states, New York, does not require photographs on driver’s
licenses.” Id. at 1126 & n.5 (majority opinion). The court noted an Indiana Supreme Court decision that
had carved out a free exercise exemption from the state’s driver’s license photo requirement, id. at 1126
n.4, but it did not discuss more broadly the existence of official state policies in the form of a state statute
or regulation providing for exemptions for religious reasons from the photo requirement. Though
probably not available in a single source at the time, state-by-state information of this sort became readily
available twenty years later in a published report. See COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC RELATIONS
RESEARCH CTR., RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN DRIVER’S LICENSE PHOTOGRAPHS: A
REVIEW OF CODES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE 50 STATES 3 (2004),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/LWVJ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26UA-2DPD].
According to that report, as of 2004, thirteen states had official policies providing for religious exemptions
from the photo requirement, three had express policies precluding such exemptions, and the remaining
states were silent on the issue. Id. at 5.
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standard of substantiality, not only on the weight of relevant precedent but also on
my own conviction of the basic soundness of that precedent. For the reasons that
follow, I am persuaded that the courts in free exercise cases prior to Smith were right
to apply the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test in the way they did.
As noted earlier, 216 I do not share the view expressed by some commentators that
the courts’ applications of the test in the free exercise area reflected a conscious effort
on their part to dilute the test. If I did, I would have great difficulty defending those
applications. For decades the Supreme Court has maintained that a state can only
justify placing a substantial burden on an individual right of fundamental
constitutional importance by showing that imposing such a burden is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest.217 In my view, that formulation strikes an
appropriate balance between the seriousness of the constitutional harm that the law
inflicts on affected individuals and the level of justification that the lawmaker should
be expected to offer. Only a state justification of the highest order should suffice to
justify an invasion of individual rights that constitutes grave constitutional harm.
I know of no persuasive reason for holding laws that substantially burden free
exercise—a right that, by virtue of its explicit mention in the First Amendment,
indisputably has fundamental constitutional importance—to a test any less
demanding than the one applied to laws that substantially burden other fundamental
rights. The incongruity of doing so seems especially apparent when one considers
free exercise alongside rights that the Court has treated as fundamental even though
they lack the kind of indisputable grounding in constitutional text, history, or
structure that free exercise has.218 Although the Court in Smith by a 5-4 margin took
a very different view of free exercise – a view that, for the most part, relegated it to
second-class status – Congress twice has firmly rejected that view. In responding to
Smith with a near-unanimous enactment of RFRA and a unanimous enactment of
RLUIPA, Congress has strongly and, I believe, correctly affirmed the soundness of
holding substantial burdens on free exercise to the same exacting standard of review
as the one to which substantial burdens on other fundamental rights are held.219
It is undoubtedly true that, prior to Smith, courts applied the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test more flexibly in the free exercise area than
they applied it, for example, in equal protection cases involving suspect classifications
216
217

See supra text accompanying note 178.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

218
The right of privacy that the Court recognized as fundamental in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and treated as so weighty in balancing individual and governmental interests in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is probably the most obvious example. Although I firmly believe (for reasons
largely not reflected in the Court’s less than impressive opinions in Griswold and Roe) that the Court was
correct in recognizing the fundamentality of that right, I readily concede that there is room for reasonable
people to disagree. See, e.g., Griswold, supra, at 508-10 (Black, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting); John
Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 927–43 (1973).
219
See supra note 55 and accompanying text. RFRA was passed in the House of Representatives by
unanimous consent in a voice vote and in the Senate by a roll call vote of 97-3. 139 CONG. REC. 9687,
26416 (1993). RLUIPA was passed by unanimous consent in a voice vote in both the House and Senate.
146 CONG. REC. 16703, H7192 (2000).
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and free speech cases involving content-based regulations.220 I suggest, however, that
the greater flexibility in application in free exercise cases did not reflect tacit
substitution of a less demanding test. Rather, it reflected the courts’ application of
the usual test with a degree of deference to the lawmaker warranted by the difference
in context.
In equal protection cases involving racial or other suspect classifications,221
courts only sensibly approach the question whether the law satisfies the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test with a healthy dose of skepticism. Any time
lawmakers make a conscious decision to treat people better or worse on the basis of
race or another suspect characteristic, there is good reason to be concerned that the
law is rooted in prejudice and harmful stereotypes and that the objective the law
purportedly serves is a pretext and cover for a more insidious objective.222 Similarly,
in free speech cases involving laws prohibiting certain speech in an effort to suppress
the speaker’s message, courts also have good reason to apply the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test with anything but deference to the
lawmaker.223 Laws that ban the expression of certain messages from the realm of
public debate, rather than allow such messages to be tested in the marketplace of
ideas, strike at the heart of the Free Speech Clause. To give laws of that sort the
benefit of any doubt is antithetical to what the Clause is all about.224
220
The Equal Protection and Free Speech Clauses provide, respectively, “No State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” id. amend. I. The latter applies to
state and local government by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
221
The Supreme Court has characterized classifications on the basis of race, nationality, alienage, and
religion as “suspect.” See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (“Unless a
classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon suspect distinctions such as race,
religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discrimination. . . .”);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (“[T]he Court’s decisions have established that
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny.”).
222
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216–17 n.14 (1982); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 728–33 (1974); Gary J. Simson, Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?,
83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1250–51, 1253–58 (1974).
223
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
224
Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), eloquently
makes the point. Schacht was convicted of violating the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 702 on wearing a
military uniform without authorization. As part of a larger demonstration against the Vietnam War,
Schacht had worn an army uniform as a costume in an antiwar skit that he and two others performed
outside a military induction center in Houston. At trial and on appeal, he argued unsuccessfully that he
in fact was authorized to wear the uniform by Congress’s express allowance in 10 U.S.C. § 772(f) for an
actor in a film or play to wear the uniform of one of the military branches “if the portrayal does not tend
to discredit that armed force.” In reversing the conviction, the Court held that the final clause of § 772(f)
– the language just quoted – was unconstitutional and must be struck from the statute:

When this restriction [§ 772(f)] is read together with 18 U.S.C. § 702, it becomes clear that
Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor wearing a military uniform to say things
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In contrast, prior to Smith, claims for exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause
almost invariably were aimed at laws that, in the overwhelming majority of their
applications, were not objectionable in the least. The free exercise claimant’s attack
on the law was not grounded in any suspicion that the law was the product of hidden
bias or disrespect for core constitutional values. Quite the contrary. The claimants
generally conceded that the law served a laudatory objective and made a good or even
excellent contribution to the general welfare. The problem that the claimants sought
to remedy was that in operation the law, though entirely religion-neutral on its face,
placed a distinctive burden on individuals adhering to certain religious beliefs.
Perhaps the lawmaker had a dim awareness that the law was creating a special burden
but failed to appreciate its gravity. Alternatively, as is especially apt to happen with
religious beliefs shared by only a tiny proportion of society, the lawmaker made the
law not even recognizing that it would have a special adverse impact on some people
because of their religious beliefs.
Either way, for courts to apply the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test with
some degree of deference to the lawmaker has a logic in the free exercise area that it
lacks in the two other areas mentioned. The fact, therefore, that courts before Smith
were applying the test in free exercise cases with a deference to the lawmaker missing
from their applications of the test in those other two areas did not mean that the
courts in free exercise cases were not really applying the test. Rather, it simply meant
that they were applying the test with sensitivity to a factor not present in the other
areas.

B. A Closer Look at, and Method for Analyzing, Ripple Effects
As I highlighted in discussing courts’ applications in free exercise cases of the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test, a recurrent and major concern has been
whether the ripple effects of exempting the claimant before the court would be so
extensive as to undermine substantially the state’s ability to achieve a compelling
interest served by the law. That concern has been so central to applications of the
test because the concern is rooted in constitutional limitations that the courts have
no latitude to ignore—specifically, constitutional limitations under the Equal
Protection, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses on treating people differently
on the basis of religion.
The Supreme Court for many years has included religion on its short list of
“suspect classifications” under the Equal Protection Clause.225 In keeping with that
during his performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed Forces. . . . [Schacht’s]
conviction can be sustained only if he can be punished for speaking out against the role of our
Army and our country in Vietnam. Clearly punishment for this reason would be an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech. The final clause of § 772(f), which leaves
Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for
opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment. . . .

Schacht, 398 U.S. at 62-63.
225
See supra note 221.
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characterization, absent a showing that the difference in treatment is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest, courts must strike down any law that treats some
persons better than others based on their adherence to different religions or religious
beliefs or based on some persons’ adherence to some religion and others’ adherence
to none. The Supreme Court also has interpreted each of the Religion Clauses in a
manner that, for all practical purposes, duplicates the Equal Protection Clause’s
demand for extraordinary justification if and when the government uses religion as a
basis for differences in treatment.226
These powerful constitutional limitations on unequal treatment on the basis of
religion have profound implications for religious exemptions. Those implications are
perhaps most easily understood from the perspective of a legislature contemplating
exempting adherents of religion X (or religious belief Y) from the demands of a
particular law. A legislature that is thinking about creating a religious exemption
must begin by asking itself (a) whether it has a constitutionally adequate justification
for not expanding the exemption to include adherents of other religions (or religious
beliefs) and (b) if not, which other religions (or religious beliefs) must be included
within the exemption to satisfy the constitutional constraints on differences in
treatment. By definition, a religious exemption classifies – treats some people better
than others – on the basis of religion. With a religious classification at issue, the
measure of constitutional adequacy is whether the difference in treatment is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Because that is a highly demanding
standard to meet, the legislature frequently will recognize that its answer to (a) must
be “no” and that, to satisfy the formidable equality demands of the Establishment,
Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses, it must expand the exemption to
encompass adherents of certain other religions (or religious beliefs).
Having arrived at such a conclusion, a legislature may decide that the benefits of
creating the exemption do not outweigh the costs and that, as a matter of policy, it
ought to abandon the exemption idea. However, if it resolves to press onward, its
constitutional inquiry is only half done. Having established the scope that the
exemption must take in order to comport with constitutional limitations on unequal
treatment, the legislature must then ask itself the distinctly Establishment Clause
question: Will the creation of an exemption of that scope substantially undermine
the achievement of a compelling interest that the law is designed to serve? If so, then
the legislature would wisely pass on the exemption idea altogether because in all
likelihood the contemplated exemption for adherents of religion X (or religious belief
Y) will be struck down under the Establishment Clause, even if expanded beyond
adherents of religion X (or religious belief Y) to satisfy constitutional constraints on
unequal treatment.

226
With regard to the Establishment Clause, see Kiryas Joel Vill. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 702–05 (1994); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–46 (1982). As to the Free Exercise Clause, see
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–21 (2017); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33 (1993).
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The requisite analysis is somewhat different if the legislature is contemplating an
exemption that preferences religion over nonreligion—for example, an exemption
limited to those who, for religious reasons, feel compelled not to engage in the
activity required by the law. Now the legislature must first ask itself whether the
constitutional limitations on unequal treatment require that the exemption be
expanded to avoid preferring religion over nonreligion. Do some people for
nonreligious reasons feel a level of compulsion not to engage in the required activity
that is comparable in intensity to the compulsion felt by those who would benefit
from the contemplated religious exemption? 227 If so, then the legislature must
acknowledge that, unless it expands the exemption to include those feeling
comparable compulsion for nonreligious reasons, the exemption almost certainly will
not survive the strict scrutiny triggered by a religious classification.
Having arrived at that juncture in its thinking, the legislature may decide as a policy
matter that the exemption idea is not worth pursuing. Assuming, however, that it
decides that an expanded exemption is better than none at all, the legislature still faces
a sizable Establishment Clause hurdle. It now must ask itself whether the expanded
exemption would substantially undermine the achievement of a compelling interest
that the law is designed to serve. If its answer is “yes,” the legislature would do well to
leave the exemption idea behind rather than invite invalidation of the expanded
exemption under the Establishment Clause.

C. An Illustration: A Variation on Masterpiece Cakeshop
For purposes of illustration, consider a variation on Masterpiece Cakeshop that I
offered in the Introduction: Suppose that after losing in the Colorado Court of
Appeals, Phillips succeeds in persuading the Colorado Supreme Court to hear the case.
Suppose also that the Colorado high court decides to reverse the judgment of the
Colorado Court of Appeals on the ground that, under the Colorado Constitution’s free
exercise guarantee, Phillips is entitled to an exemption from the state’s
Anti-Discrimination Act. If the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari to decide
whether the court-created exemption violates the federal Establishment Clause, how
should it rule?
As discussed earlier,228 I believe that, though hardly trivial, the burden the
Anti-Discrimination Act places on Phillips’s religious liberty is not sufficiently weighty
to qualify as “substantial” under the proposed approach. If the Court were to take the
same view, then, under that approach, it would hold that, unless there is no rational
justification for denying him the exemption, the Colorado high court’s exempting
Phillips from the Act violates the Establishment Clause. The Court would then go on
to find that a rational justification plainly exists, because denying Phillips an exemption
is a reasonable means of serving the Colorado interest underlying the Act of protecting
227
See Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 511–15 (2017);
Simson, supra note 22, at 914–15.
228
See supra Part VI.C.
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patrons of places of public accommodation from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
But what if the Court at the start of its Establishment Clause analysis instead were
to take the view that the burden on Phillip’s religious liberty is best understood as
substantial? Then, under my proposed approach, the Court would hold that the
Colorado high court’s exempting Phillips from the Act survives Establishment Clause
review unless denying the exemption is necessary to a compelling state interest. That
would be a rigorous standard for those opposing the exemption to meet, but it is also a
standard I believe they could meet. In fact, as I explain below, I do not see it as a close
question. My explanation has importance for any religious exemption claim, but it has
special importance for a type of claim made more and more often in recent years: what
Professors NeJaime and Siegel have called “complicity-based conscience
claims” – claims that, like Phillips’s, are based on “religious objections to being
made complicit in the assertedly sinful conduct of others.”229
Applying the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test to the Colorado high court’s
decision to exempt Phillips from the Act, the Court would find an Establishment
Clause violation if two conditions are met: a compelling state interest would be served
by denying Phillips the exemption, and denying the exemption is necessary to serve
that interest. I submit that the Court should conclude that both conditions are met. As
to the first, Colorado’s interest in protecting patrons of places of public accommodation
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation seems at least as important to
the well-being of the people of the state as the interest in Yoder of fostering individual
self-reliance and self-sufficiency, the interest in Lee of ensuring the fiscal vitality of the
social security system, and the interest in Pacific Press of assuring equal employment
opportunities – all interests that, as already discussed,230 the Supreme Court or a federal
appeals court treated as compelling. Concededly, none of those interests is so vital to
the general welfare that the state would stop at nothing to defend it. The same
can be said, however, of numerous governmental interests that the Court has
treated as compelling in free speech and other cases in which it applied the
necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test.231 Ultimately, for present purposes, it is the
operative conception of “compelling” state interest, not some abstract or hypothetical
229

Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2519 (2015). Professors NeJaime and Siegel observed that
“[c]omplicity claims are now asserted by growing numbers of Americans about some of the most
contentious ‘culture war’ issues of our day.” They also pointed out that such claims typically are aimed at
“persons who act outside of traditional family roles” and “seek exemptions from laws designed to protect
others whose beliefs and actions the claimants condemn.” Id. at 2520 & n.12.
230
See supra Part VII.A.
231
Consider, for example, the following interests that the Court has treated as compelling: the
interest in protecting the judicial system from outside pressures that the Court in Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965), cited in rejecting a free speech challenge to a prohibition on picketing near a courthouse;
the interest in ensuring an informed electorate that the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972),
found insufficiently well-served in upholding a voting rights challenge to a durational residence
requirement for voting; and the interest in achieving a diverse student body that the Court in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), recognized in upholding a University of Michigan Law School affirmative
action admissions program.
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conception, that counts, and by that yardstick, the anti-discrimination interest at issue
in Masterpiece Cakeshop comfortably qualifies as compelling.
If any uncertainty remains as to whether that interest deserves the “compelling”
label, the text of the Colorado Act should dispel it. The Act specifically names “sexual
orientation,” along with race, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, and disability,
as a “discriminatory” and “unlawful” basis for a place of public accommodation to treat
some patrons worse than others.232 The Act’s inclusion of sexual orientation on such a
short list with race, religion, national origin, and sex makes clear the great importance
that Colorado attaches to the interest at hand. The Supreme Court has singled out as
constitutionally “suspect” any state discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or
national origin,233 and the Court has been only moderately less skeptical of the validity
of any state discrimination based on sex.234 It is hardly a stretch to assume that
Colorado regards eradicating discrimination on those bases by private actors – ones,
like Phillips, operating a place of public accommodation – as a state interest of
compelling importance.
Granted, a court deciding whether or not a state is acting within federal
constitutional bounds cannot responsibly treat a state interest as compelling simply
because the state regards it as such. The question is one of federal, not state, law. It
would be inconsistent with basic principles of federalism, however, for a court not to
show significant deference to the importance that a state can demonstrate it attaches
to a particular interest. When, as with the anti-discrimination interest at issue in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the state clearly treats an interest as compelling, and when a
court is satisfied, as it should be in this instance, that the interest may fairly be
characterized as one of compelling importance to the general welfare, a finding that
the interest is compelling is in order.
I suggest that the second condition noted above – a necessary means-end
relationship between denying the exemption and achieving a compelling state
interest – is met because, in and of itself, an exemption for Phillips is so harmful that
Colorado needs to deny it in order to ensure that achievement of the state’s
compelling interest is not substantially compromised. After all, the harm that an
exemption for Phillips threatens to inflict on same-sex couples is hardly limited to
their having to look elsewhere for a custom wedding cake and perhaps having to
settle for one not as good as Phillips could make.235 Instead, it includes the
humiliation, stigma, and other adverse effects of being refused service because of
232
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2018). The Act also names “color” and
“ancestry,” which are commonly subsumed under “race” and “national origin,” respectively. For clarity and
simplicity, I use only the two latter terms. For the same reasons, I use “religion” rather than the Act’s
word, “creed,” which encompasses, and is often equated with, “religion” but is used infrequently enough
today to invite possible misunderstanding.
233
See supra note 221.
234
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996).
235
In his petition seeking Supreme Court review, Phillips seemed to suggest otherwise. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 6 (“Although Respondents Craig and Mullins easily obtained a
free wedding cake with a rainbow design from another bakery, they filed a charge of sexual orientation
discrimination….”).
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one’s sexual orientation. That harm, like the harm in Bob Jones University to
applicants denied admission because of their race,236 is very real and does not go away
simply because something much like the desired item – whether a custom wedding
cake or a college education – can be purchased elsewhere.
In my view, the above reason alone is sufficient to establish the necessity of
denying Phillips an exemption. Assuming, however, for purposes of argument, that
it is not, I submit that the necessity of denying him an exemption is established
beyond debate when that reason is considered in tandem with the potential ripple
effects of granting him the exemption. As discussed below, granting Phillips an
exemption from the Anti-Discrimination Act triggers an obligation to grant one to
countless others because the state must satisfy the strictures that the Equal Protection
Clause and the Religion Clauses place on differences in treatment on the basis of
religion; and granting such a multitude of exemptions cannot help but substantially
undermine the achievement of Colorado’s compelling interest in protecting patrons
of places of public accommodation from discriminatory treatment based on sexual
orientation.
Most obviously, if Phillips is granted an exemption, one must also be granted to
other Christian bakers in Colorado who share Phillips’s understanding of
Christianity as a prohibition on designing and making wedding cakes for same-sex
couples. It is difficult to estimate how many Colorado bakers meet this description.237
On the one hand, some Christian denominations, such as the Episcopal and
Presbyterian Churches,238 officially support same-sex marriage, and many members
of Christian denominations officially opposed to same-sex marriage, such as the
Roman Catholic and Mormon Churches,239 deviate from their church’s position.240 On
the other hand, a sizable proportion of Colorado adults – almost two-thirds – call
themselves Christian;241a significant percentage of members of denominations
officially opposed to same-sex marriage do adhere to their church’s position; and
individual Christians religiously opposed to same-sex marriage are entitled to respect

236

See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.

237

For the story of a bakery owner who shares not only Phillips’s views about custom wedding cakes
and same-sex marriage but also his readiness to litigate all the way to the highest appellate court to defend
those views, see Adam Liptak, Across the Atlantic, Another Court Case About Cake and Gay Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2017, at A18.
238
See David Masci & Michael Lipka, Where Christian Churches, Other Religions Stand on Gay
Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/21/wherechristian-churches-stand-on-gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/Y5AJ-7BAH].
239
240

See id.
See Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups That Had Been Skeptical, PEW

RES. CTR. (June 26, 2017), www.people-press.org/2017/06/26/support-for-same-sex-marriage-growseven-among-groups-that-had-been-skeptical [https://perma.cc/F7HV-3GSN]. Most striking is the support
among Catholics— sixty-seven percent. See id.
241
See Religious Landscape Study: Religious Composition of Adults in Colorado, PEW RES. CTR.,
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/colorado/ [https://perma.cc/C497-QMEC].
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for free exercises purposes in their understanding of Christianity, even if that
understanding deviates from their particular denomination’s official position.242
Of course, any exemption granted to Phillips cannot conceivably be limited to
bakers who are Christian. Islam and Orthodox Judaism, for example, officially oppose
same-sex marriage.243 Though only a very small percentage of the state population,244
Colorado’s Muslims and Orthodox Jews may include some bakers who share Phillips’s
views on same-sex marriage; if so, they would have every reason to claim a right to an
exemption like his.
If the only Coloradans able to make potent religious-equality claims for exemptions
like the one granted to Phillips were likeminded Christian, Muslim, and Orthodox
Jewish bakers, the ripple effects of granting Phillips an exemption might be no big deal.
However, those claims are truly no more than the tip of the tip of the iceberg.
First of all, consider the very wide range of businesses covered by the Colorado
Act’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Act
bars such discrimination in any “place of public accommodation,”245 which it initially
defines in broad terms: “any place of business engaged in any sales to the public and
any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to the
public.”246 It then names, as nonexclusive examples (“including but not limited to”),
more than thirty types of covered businesses, ranging from businesses “offering
wholesale or retail sales to the public” to businesses where people can “eat, drink, sleep,
or rest” to barbershops, hospitals, mortuaries, and more.247
If Phillips is granted an exemption, a multitude of people in the wide variety of
businesses covered by the Act thereby acquire potent religious equality claims for
exemptions of their own. Consider, for example, a caterer and a reception-hall owner
who, as a Christian and an Orthodox Jew, respectively, believe that same-sex marriage
is sinful. The caterer believes that her catering a same-sex wedding reception would be
sinful because it would facilitate the same-sex couple’s sinful behavior. The
reception-hall owner believes his renting the hall for such a reception would be sinful
for a somewhat different reason: it would send a message to God, the same-sex couple,
their wedding guests, and anyone else who learns about it that he approves of, and
encourages, same-sex marriage.
242

See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981), discussed supra note 147.
Although some Christians belong to no denomination, fewer than one percent of Christians
nationally seem to fit that description, see Religious Landscape Study: Religions, P EW R ES. C TR.,
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ [https://perma.cc/7K9F-E7Z3] (last visited
June 26, 2018), and the percentage in Colorado appears to be only slightly higher, see Religious Landscape
Study: Religious Composition of Adults in Colorado, supra note 241. In seeking Supreme Court review,
Phillips asserted that his opposition to same-sex marriage derives from his Christian faith, but he did not
identify himself as belonging to any particular denomination. See supra note 150.
243
See Masci & Lipka, supra note 238.
244
See Religious Landscape Study: Religious Composition of Adults in Colorado, supra note 241
(listing Muslim population as less than 1% and the Jewish population – of which Orthodox Jews are a subset –
as 1%).
245
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2018).
246
Id. § 24-34-601(1).
247

Id.
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Under the Supreme Court’s definition of “religion,” a court cannot treat the
caterer’s or the reception-hall owner’s religious objections to using her catering services
or his reception hall for a same-sex marriage as any less deserving of respect than
Phillips’s objections. Perhaps a much higher proportion of people who are religiously
opposed to same-sex marriage would be supportive of Phillips’s claim than would
support either of the other two. For constitutional purposes, however, that is beside the
point, as are questions such as whether the causal connection between the caterer’s
agreeing to cater a same-sex wedding and the same-sex couple’s actually getting
married is too attenuated for the caterer’s facilitation objection to be taken seriously.
Perhaps the court finds the reception-hall owner’s reason for his religious objection to
be unpersuasive because the court believes that no one sensibly infers anything about a
reception-hall owner’s beliefs from the identity of the people renting it. That too has
no place in the court’s decision.
The basic principle, according to the Court, is simple: “[R]eligious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”248 I have no misgivings about that principle. I have enormous
misgivings, however, about the consequences that principle can unleash in combination
with exemptions for Phillips’s and others’ conscience-based complicity claims.
If the almost boundless ripple effects of granting an exemption to Phillips are not
apparent from the examples discussed thus far, the following hypothetical claim arising
outside the context of the same-sex wedding itself should leave no room for doubt. A
restaurant owner maintains that, as a Muslim, he believes that same-sex marriage is
sinful and that he is complicit in the sin of same-sex marriage if he provides service to
any same-sex couple, married or not. After all, he reasons, providing service to married
same-sex couples promotes same-sex marriage by making clear to unmarried same-sex
couples that they will be accepted by society if they decide to marry. By the same token,
in his view, providing service to unmarried same-sex couples is problematic because it
tells them that society welcomes them as a couple and thereby enhances the likelihood
that they will remain together long enough to get married.
Whether shared by many or few, the restaurant owner’s religious beliefs are no less
entitled to protection than Phillips’s. Granting an exemption to Phillips and not to the
restaurant owner would be a difference in treatment on the basis of religion lacking the
strong justification that religious classifications demand. As should be apparent, similar
religious equality objections could be made with comparable force by owners of almost
any of the many businesses covered by the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
Granting an exemption to Phillips opens the door wide to claims for exemptions from
owners of retail clothing stores, barber shops, gyms, movie theaters, and more. Even
the owner of a mortuary could have a strong religious equality claim for an exemption
if one is granted to Phillips. If she sincerely believes she would be complicit in the sins
of same-sex couples who marry if she does not do her utmost to deter same-sex
marriage by refusing to provide funeral services for anyone who entered into such a
marriage, is her belief any less entitled to respect than Phillips’s?
248

Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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Finally, I call attention to two types of ripple effects not mentioned in the above
discussion. I saw no need to explore them in that discussion, because of the many more
obvious ripple effects that, I believe, make an exemption for Phillips constitutionally
untenable. I note them now, however, because in some instances, it may make a
difference to consider them. First, as noted earlier,249 the Equal Protection, Free
Exercise, and Establishment Clauses invalidate the use of any religious classification,
including one that prefers religion to nonreligion, unless the classification is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest. Accordingly, if A is exempted from a law that she
cannot obey for religious reasons, then, unless it is necessary to a compelling interest to
do otherwise, an exemption also must be given to B, who, for reasons of conscience
that constrain her with comparable force, is similarly unable to obey the law. Second,
as the Court acknowledged in Lee,250 ripple effects are not limited to claims for
exemptions from the particular law under review. Assume, for example, that Colorado
has a law that provides protection against sexual orientation discrimination in a variety
of circumstances not covered by the Anti-Discrimination Act. An exemption for
Phillips from the Anti-Discrimination Act very likely would call for exemptions from
that other law too.

D. Legislative vs. Judicial Exemptions, and Another Variation on
Masterpiece Cakeshop
The final step of my proposed approach, Step 4, calls for some deference to the
lawmaker in applying the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test to a legislative
exemption that lifts a substantial burden on free exercise. Like Step 3, which deals with
court-created exemptions, Step 4 focuses the court’s attention on the question of whether
denying the exemption at hand is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. However,
unlike Step 3, Step 4 tells the court not to address the question directly and give the
answer that it would give as a court exercising its independent judgment. Instead, the
court’s job is to address the question only indirectly through the lens of the legislature’s
implicit judgment that the exemption is constitutional under the applicable
Establishment Clause standard of review. Even if a court, as a matter of independent
judgment, would conclude that denying a legislative exemption is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest – a conclusion that would require invalidating the exemption if
it were judicially created – the court under Step 4 should uphold the exemption if it
determines that the legislature had a substantial basis for coming to the contrary
conclusion. In essence, the court gives the benefit of the doubt to legislative exemptions
when their validity presents a close question.
Consider for purposes of illustration another variation on Masterpiece Cakeshop that
I offered in the Introduction. Suppose that after getting no relief in the Colorado courts,
Phillips decides not to seek U.S. Supreme Court review but instead pursues in earnest a
legislative solution. Suppose also that before long he and some influential allies succeed
249
250

See supra Part VII.B.
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982); supra text accompanying notes 184–85.
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in persuading the Colorado legislature to enact an exemption to the Anti-Discrimination
Act very similar in scope to the one that he had sought in court. Under my proposed
approach, should the legislative exemption survive an Establishment Clause challenge
even though, for the reasons set forth in Parts VI.C and VII.C, a judicially crafted
exemption of essentially the same scope should not?
The answer almost certainly is “no” regardless of whether the court determines that
the burden on religious liberty lifted by the exemption is insubstantial or substantial. If
the court determines that the burden is insubstantial, as I have suggested it most
reasonably would do, the unconstitutionality of the legislative exemption is clear. Under
Step 2, the fact that an exemption is legislative, rather than judicial, is of no importance,
and an exemption that lifts an insubstantial burden violates the Establishment Clause
unless there is no rational basis for denying the exemption, In this instance, the existence
of a rational basis is beyond dispute: serving the state interest underlying the
Anti-Discrimination Act of protecting the populace from discrimination on the basis of
any of the characteristics listed in the Act. Accordingly, the exemption should fall.
The result should be no different if the court determines that the burden is
substantial, as I have suggested it has at least a reasonable basis for doing (even though
not a basis that I find ultimately persuasive). Although giving the benefit of the doubt to
a legislative exemption can mean the difference in close cases between upholding an
exemption and striking it down, the Establishment Clause issue presented here is simply
not a close one. For the reasons detailed in Part VII.C, a legislative exemption akin to
the one Phillips sought in court so seriously detracts from the state’s ability to serve its
compelling anti-discrimination interest that the Colorado legislature has no substantial
basis for believing that denying the exemption is not necessary to a compelling state
interest.
CONCLUSION: THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In closing, I would like to discuss briefly a few related ideas. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to attempt to explore any of them in the depth they deserve, but I do think
broaching them now helps place in proper perspective the Establishment Clause
approach I have proposed.
At the start of the Article,251 I made clear that I predicate my proposed approach on
the assumption that, despite some Justices’ expressed desires to the contrary, the
endorsement test continues to be good law in the Supreme Court and has not been
displaced by a coercion test as the primary measure of an Establishment Clause violation.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I would like to underline here a couple of points
about that assumption.
First, in making explicit my reliance on that assumption, I do not mean to imply that
Establishment Clause limitations on religious exemptions are necessarily insignificant if
endorsement is not the applicable test. Note, for example, that in denying an Amish
employer’s request for an exemption from social security taxes, the Court in United States
251

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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v. Lee252 characterized the effect of granting the exemption in terms that mirror the
coercion test and have possible far-reaching implications for other religious exemptions.
“Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer,” the Court explained,
“operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.”253
Second, and more broadly, the endorsement test represents not only what I believe is
the governing Establishment Clause test in the Supreme Court but also what I believe it
should be. As I have argued elsewhere,254 interpreting the Establishment Clause as
providing the protection against government sponsorship of religion guaranteed by the
endorsement test comports much better with the text and history of the Clause than
interpreting it as affording protection only against government coercion. An
interpretation limited to coercion wrongly treats as inconsequential the various significant
harms caused by government endorsement of religion, ranging from alienating
nonadherents of the favored religion to degrading the favored religion and more.255
An interpretation of the Establishment Clause that limits it to a constraint on
coercion also makes the Clause little, if anything, more than a carbon copy of its
companion clause in the First Amendment—the Free Exercise Clause. For those who
look at a strong Establishment Clause as the enemy of religious liberty, that may seem an
interpretation with much to commend it, but as a final point, I want to urge a different
perspective—one that sees both of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses as essential
partners in the enterprise of preserving religious liberty. My proposed approach in this
Article to Establishment Clause limitations on religious exemptions takes those
limitations seriously but, I believe, no more seriously than the ultimate objective of
preserving religious liberty demands.

252

455 U.S. 252 (1982), discussed supra text accompanying notes 179–85.
Id. at 261. For an analogous argument that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violate the
Establishment Clause even if a coercion test is applied, see Gary J. Simson, Religion by Any Other Name?
Prohibitions on Same-Sex Marriage and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 132, 194–97 (2012) (maintaining, a few years prior to the Court’s invalidation of such prohibitions
in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), that prohibitions on same-sex marriage coerce same-sex
couples to live their lives within legal constraints best understood as codifications of religious beliefs).
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See Simson, supra note 19, at 301–04.
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See id. at 304–08; Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 441, 464–
68, 479–81 (1996).
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